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THE HISTORICAL CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
“CONCEPTS”
Glenn E. Chappell *
ABSTRACT
The concepts/conceptions dichotomy is prominent in both the
philosophy of language and the field of constitutional interpretation. It is most prominently illustrated through the provisions in the
Constitution that contain broad, open-ended moral language.
Those who hold the “conceptions” view believe that the legal content
of those provisions includes both abstract moral concepts and its
communicators’ subjective beliefs about, or conceptions of, how
those concepts should apply. Under this view, the judge’s role is
mostly empirical: he is tasked with examining historical evidence to
ascertain those conceptions, which in turn supply applicational criteria by which he can decide specific cases. Alternatively, those who
hold the “concepts,” or conceptual, view believe that the Constitution’s language directs the reader to objective moral concepts only;
hence, its legal content does not contain any particular person’s or
group of persons’ conceptions of those concepts. Thus, under this
view, the judge’s task is mostly analytical: he must attempt to analyze the concepts to ascertain their defining criteria and develop applicational criteria from that analysis.
Through a focused study of the interpretive methods of William
Cushing, James Madison, and lawmakers in the Virginia House of
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Anthony J. Trenga, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, 2018–2019; Law Clerk to the Honorable Gerald Bard Tjoflat,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2017–2018. J.D., 2017, Duke University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Saint Leo University. The views expressed in this article
are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my employers. I owe special gratitude to
Ryan Pitts for his generous contributions to this article, which include hours of proofreading, editing, and challenging discussion, and to Judge Tjoflat for his mentorship and encouragement. I would also like to thank Cory Fleming, Spencer Hughes, and Alexander Flynn
Kasnetz for their helpful suggestions and edits, and my family for their unending patience
and support. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the University of Richmond Law
Review for their superb, indispensable work in preparing this article for publication.
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Delegates, this article demonstrates that this debate has existed
since at least the founding era, and that the above-named foundingera authorities held a conceptual view of the Constitution’s language, as evidenced by the logic-driven, as opposed to historical, research-driven, mode of construction they employed to apply the Constitution’s provisions to particular cases. Specifically, they analyzed
the Constitution’s text, structure, and moral authority to develop an
American conception of the concept at issue—a conception wholly
unconcerned with the subjective beliefs of any particular person or
polity as to how the concept should apply. Finally, this article sets
forth a preliminary sketch of the conceptual approach’s normative
claim. It concludes that the conceptual approach taken by these authorities better respects the constitutional text, the Rule of Law, and
the ideal of objectivity in law than those that seek to derive legal
content from the conceptions of past actors.
INTRODUCTION
When the Constitution uses abstract, open-ended moral language like “cruel and unusual punishments,” 1 what supplies the
criteria for applying that law in specific cases? The answer to this
question depends on your theory of language. Some say the words
communicate both abstract moral concepts and the subjective
views of those who ratified the Constitution as to what defines
those concepts. 2 We will call this the conceptions view. If this view
is correct, the communicators’ values supply the legal content. And
the judge’s task is mostly empirical: he looks back in history to the
time of enactment to divine the moral values of the ratifiers and
then formulates an applicational methodology in accordance with
what he finds. If this is the case, what governs is someone’s conception of the moral principle identified by the law, rather than the
concept itself.
From a normative standpoint, this view of legal communication
offers some attractive features. Chief among these is judicial restraint—at least to the many who believe that judicial restraint is
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 146 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The Americans of 1791 . . . were embedding in the Bill of Rights their moral values, for otherwise all its general and abstract guarantees could be brought to nought.”).
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a good thing. 3 Assuming the original moral values can be discovered, this view makes the judge a simple historian; thus, he has no
opportunity to impose his personal views on the public through the
nondemocratic vehicle of judicial decision making. The problem,
however, is that this assumes such original values can be found.
Do we have enough evidence in the record to state with confidence
what those values were? Further, whose values control? Only a
fragment of the founding generation got a say in the enactment of
the Constitution. 4 And, unless we are looking for the subjective
moral values of those who drafted the Constitution, how do we get
around the likely fact that the vast majority of the public lacked
political and philosophical sophistication such that they probably
didn’t have a firm grasp on how their values should apply in discrete controversies? 5 These questions are not new, but they only
become more salient as time passes.
Others hold a different view of legal language. They say the Constitution’s abstract terms communicate only ideas, or concepts, not
the conceptions of those concepts espoused by those who communicated them. 6 We will call this the concepts, or conceptual, view.
Thus, the judge must derive rules of application from the moral
principle itself, and he is consequently not bound to adopt the past
moral conceptions of the ratifiers. If this is so, the judge’s inquiry
grows less empirical and more logical: he must identify the objective characteristics that define the moral principle identified by the
language and develop applicational criteria based on those features. This view of the Constitution assumes necessarily that there
are objective, discoverable criteria that distinguish the concepts
3. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 275 (2005) (“In a democracy, innovation in law
and policy is supposed to come from officials elected by the People, not from unelected
judges.”); J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1981) (“[J]udicial restraint is consistent with and complementary to the balance of power among the three independent branches.”).
4. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2000) (estimating that at the time of ratification,
the franchise was limited to sixty to seventy percent of white, adult, male citizens).
5. See Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625, 629
(2012) (concluding on the basis of historical evidence that “the public may well have been
poorly informed about many constitutional issues at the time of ratification”).
6. See TARA SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN OBJECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 154 (2015) (“[A]
word stands for all things of the relevant kind, rather than for simply the particular concrete
instances of that kind with which particular speakers are acquainted or for simply the criteria that speakers employ in determining which things qualify as members of the relevant
kind.”).
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identified by words. At first glance, this approach seems much
more consistent with the ideal of the Rule of Law: if a judge using
this approach strikes down a punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, he does it not because someone thought it was “cruel
and unusual,” but because it is “cruel and unusual.” Moreover, this
grounds the law in the words the Framers actually used. If the
judge decides a case like the example above and gets the analysis
right, he has made the content of the law squarely match the language of the law.
But the problem with this approach is the difficulty of the logical
analysis. While this approach lacks the evidentiary problems inherent in inquiries based on the conceptions of past actors, it also
lacks well-defined rules of the game vis-à-vis the logical examination. We don’t even agree on the first-order epistemology, 7 so where
can a judge turn for neutral criteria, other than to his own moral
values? Put differently, what can keep the judge from using his socalled objective examination as a thin veil behind which to make
his own moral judgments the sole applicational criteria? (If he does
so, he is just giving his conception force of law, instead of the conception of past actors.) There are no easy answers to these questions.
What we have just discussed is a fundamental interpretive question that lies at the heart of the debate over what laws mean in
practice. To put it into modern parlance, this is the concepts/conceptions dichotomy. 8 The root of this distinction lies in differences
in views on how language affects law. If abstract, open-ended laws
identify moral ideas, or concepts, then those concepts are the law,
and the interpreter must look beyond the “meaning” of the words
for rules by which to apply them in discrete cases. 9 If, on the other
hand, those laws identify a particular person’s or group of persons’
conception of those moral principles, then those provisions have a
7. See generally W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y 167 (1956) (positing that some moral concepts appear to be universally accepted in
the abstract, but are “essentially contested” in their application (thus evincing widespread
disagreement over their defining criteria)).
8. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 70–72 (1986) (introducing and discussing the
concepts/conceptions dichotomy in interpretive practice).
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 641, 645–46 (2013) (“When the Constitution . . . uses vague language, standards, or
principles, an inquiry into original meaning will not be sufficient to decide most contested
questions. Hence there is a second activity of constitutional interpretation, called constitutional construction.”).
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more determinate “meaning” that will decide individual cases more
frequently 10 (that is, of course, assuming that there is enough evidence to divine that more determinate meaning).
This article will demonstrate that this fundamental debate
about law’s true nature has existed in this country since the Revolution. It will do so by scrutinizing legal opinions, correspondence,
and legislative debates from the Founding Era. We will focus primarily on only one side of the debate, however: those whose interpretive methods belied a conceptual view of the Constitution’s abstract language. We do so because this side of the debate has been
largely overlooked by modern scholars. This is unfortunate, because conceptual views of the Constitution were held by some of
the most prominent lawyers and lawmakers in that era.
Specifically, we will closely examine the interpretive methods of
two eminent lawyers, one a prominent Federalist and one a committed Anti-Federalist. The former was Justice William Cushing,
a successful Massachusetts lawyer, patriot, decades-long appellate
judge, longtime friend of John Adams, and a member of George
Washington’s inaugural class of Supreme Court justices. 11
Throughout his career, which began before the Revolution and continued into the nineteenth century, Justice Cushing took a conceptual stance toward questions of constitutional interpretation. This
is illustrated perfectly by his instructions to the jury in Commonwealth v. Jennison, 12 one of the first cases in America in which
slavery was held in violation of the law—namely, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. 13 It is further elaborated by his correspondence with John Adams over the meaning and application of

10. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 751–52 (“Under an original public meaning analysis that focuses
on how a reasonable, well-informed reader would understand the language of a clause, language is ordinarily, if not always, reasonably understood as having a single meaning. . . .
Thus, there is little reason to believe that there will be two meanings to a provision that
cannot be resolved.”).
11. See generally HENRY FLANDERS, The Life of William Cushing, in 2 THE LIVES AND
TIMES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 9, 9–51
(1875) (recounting Justice Cushing’s life and career).
12. PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC. 1873–1875, at 293 (1783).
13. See John D. Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 132–33 (1961) (reproducing Justice Cushing’s instructions
to the jury). See generally Emory Washburn, Extinction of Slavery in Massachusetts, 3 PROC.
MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 1855–1858, at 188 (1857) (recounting Commonwealth v. Jennison and
the series of cases leading up to it).

CHAPPELL AC 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

378

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:54 PM

[Vol. 53:373

Massachusetts’ version of freedom of the press, 14 as well as his
opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 15 one of the first Supreme Court
decisions of significance. 16
The latter was James Madison, an iconic patriot, a lifelong lawyer, a leading architect of the Constitution, and our fourth president. 17 His conceptual view of the Constitution is illuminated by
his comprehensive report to the Virginia House of Delegates 18 in
support of the Virginia Resolution of 1800, which declared the federal Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 unconstitutional. 19
Finally, to show that these men’s very similar methodologies
were not historical anomalies, we will look to one of the earliest
instances of public constitutional interpretation: the vociferous debate over those same Alien and Sedition Acts. 20 Specifically, we
will examine the interpretive arguments made by members of the
Virginia House of Delegates, which had among its ranks some of
the most notable lawyers and lawmakers of the period, 21 to demonstrate that a conceptual view of the Constitution was quite common.
This article does not purport to prove that the conceptual view
of the Constitution was universally held, or even that it was the

14. Letter from William Cushing to John Adams (Feb. 18, 1789), https://founders.arc
hives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0471 [https://perma.cc/9J9D-BT5T].
15. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
16. See Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1739 (2007).
17. See generally KEVIN R.C. GUTZMAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA
(2012) (documenting Madison’s life and career).
18. Virginia Report of 1799, and Analysis Thereof, in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–
1800, TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA
RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798, THE DEBATE AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON IN THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, AND SEVERAL OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS 178, 189–237 (1850) [hereinafter Virginia Report].
19. See Resolutions of Virginia of December 21, 1798, and Debate and Vote Thereon, in
THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER
WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798, THE DEBATE AND PROCEEDINGS
THEREON IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, AND SEVERAL OTHER DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS, supra note 18, at 22, 22–23 [hereinafter
Resolutions and Debate].
20. See id. at 24–161.
21. See Michael W. Steinberg, Books for Lawyers: Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Judicial
Conduct, 68 A.B.A. J. 716, 722 (1982) (book review) (calling the Virginia bar in the founding
era “star-studded”).
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predominant view. 22 The historical evidence is simply too thin a
basis upon which to make such claims, and the record contains
many instances in which interpreters held the conceptions view instead. Here, we are simply showing that the concepts/conceptions
divide has existed from the beginning.
But the historical record does more than just show that the conceptual view of constitutional language existed. It also demonstrates how the subjects of our analysis dealt with the critical problem of deriving applicational criteria from abstract, open-ended
moral concepts. They did so in a manner much different from, and
much more restrained than, Dworkin’s open-ended “moral reading” approach, which openly invites judicial fiat. 23 Our subjects employed a two-step interpretive approach. First, they examined the
original linguistic meaning of the Constitution’s text to uncover the
concept the language identified. Then, they derived applicational
criteria by considering the structure and moral authority of America’s constitutional government and using rigorous logical reasoning to develop a construction of the provision at issue that would
protect those principles. This construction was an “American conception” of the concept—a conception derived not at all from the
subjective opinions of the drafters, ratifiers, or the public, but from
a logical analysis of the concept’s operation within the constitutional scheme. Put succinctly, they treated the Constitution as an
integrated, rational system that worked in harmony to serve a
shared purpose—the purpose of protecting liberty.
This reliance on logical analysis and rational operation in turn
bespeaks our subjects’ view that the constitutional language identified concepts, not conceptions. They paid fidelity to the government the People created and thus rejected conceptions of particular
provisions that ran counter to the text and moral authority of that
government, even when those conceptions might have been popu-

22. Others, however, have argued persuasively that the founding generation used interpretive methodologies far broader than those which the conventional wisdom suggests.
See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 983, 1006 (2009)
(“As a substantive matter, the Founding generation also looked beyond text to determine
constitutional meaning. They consistently relied on a range of factors, such as structural
concerns, policy, ratifiers’ and drafters’ intent, and broad principles of government. To exclude such nontextual factors from constitutional interpretation is to depart from original
public meaning because the Founders gave these factors great weight in ascertaining meaning.”).
23. See infra note 253.
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larly understood to be of narrower application at the time of ratification. The American conception our subjects developed thus remained completely agnostic to contemporary understandings of
constitutional rights in particular cases, and instead embraced
only the contemporary meaning of those rights, as directed by the
Constitution’s text, structure, and moral authority. This logicdriven inquiry separated their method from both Dworkin’s openended “moral reading” and the methods of those who understand
original “meaning” to encompass both the linguistic meaning of the
words made into law and the subjective moral opinions of the communicators as to how the law should apply in specific controversies.
Our examination of these early conceptual approaches allows us
to situate them in the modern framework with which we categorize
interpretive methods. Although they might seem purposive or
structural at first glance, we will see that they were, at heart, textual. This is because, more than anything else, the constitutional
text dominated their analyses. The structural and moral considerations were important, because they supplied the necessary context in which the concepts identified by the text must be applied.
But at the end of the day, these lawyers interpreted the broad constitutional language to protect the broad concepts that naturally
flow from that language in the mind of an average reader. This is
textualism at heart, but it is not literalism or strict textualism.
Finally, the historical record provides some insight into the conceptual approach’s normative claim. A full exposition of that claim
would require far more space than this article provides; nevertheless, we can draw a preliminary sketch to advance the debate. We
will see that three considerations dominate: textual fidelity, reason, and objectivity.
This article is one part narrative, one part reflective, and one
part argumentative. Part I briefly reviews the concepts/conceptions dichotomy. Part II reviews a series of founding-era cases and
debates in which prominent lawyers and jurists employed a conceptual approach to constitutional interpretation. Part III expounds upon the interpretive choices underlying the conceptual
approach and, based upon that analysis, situates it within and
among the interpretive families we commonly use today. Part IV
outlines the conceptual approach’s normative claim and proffers
some preliminary arguments in its favor.
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I. CONCEPTS VERSUS CONCEPTIONS: THE PHILOSOPHICAL
BACKDROP
The distinction between concepts and conceptions is critical to
understanding the conceptual approach this article lays out.
Therefore, we begin with a primer on this fundamental interpretive divide and the scholarly debate surrounding it.
A. Dworkin and His Discontents
As we will see, the distinction between concepts and conceptions
has been recognized, albeit obliquely, for generations of legal interpreters. However, it appears that the distinction was first identified expressly in the mid-twentieth century by philosopher William
Gallie. 24 He posited that some moral concepts that appear to be
universally accepted in the abstract are “essentially contested” in
their application. 25 In other words, we agree that moral judgments
like “fair,” “just,” “cruel,” and “evil” exist, but we do not possess
shared criteria for defining those concepts. 26 For example, you and
I agree that to consider whether something is “just” is a valid moral
inquiry. Suppose we further agree that it is “just” to require a person who has borrowed money from another to repay that person in
some way, even if the debtor runs into unexpected financial hardship and cannot honor the original terms of the loan agreement.
Let’s say I believe it is “just” for the creditor to force the debtor at
gun point to work without pay in the creditor’s widget factory until
he has produced enough widgets to generate profits that cover the
principal and interest on the loan. You disagree on the basis that
my proposed form of repayment is a fundamentally “unjust” remedy for failure to repay any monetary debt. So while we
acknowledge the existence of the moral truth that something is
“just,” and thus accept the concept of “just,” you have your own particular conception of “just” that differs from mine.

24. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 43 (2015); see also Gallie, supra note 7, at 167.
25. See generally Gallie, supra note 7.
26. See generally id. Lawrence Solum expounds helpfully upon Gallie’s work in The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning. See Solum, supra note 24, at
43.
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The late Ronald Dworkin, a “preeminent legal theorist” among
modern scholars 27 and the second-most cited legal scholar of the
twentieth century, 28 was perhaps the first to discuss the concepts/
conceptions divide in the specific context of constitutional interpretation, and he was certainly the most prominent to do so. 29 Using
the Eighth Amendment as an example, he described the concepts/
conceptions divide that constitutional interpreters thusly:
[The interpreter] must choose between two clarifying translations—
two different accounts of what the framers intended to say in the
Eighth Amendment. The first reading supposes that the framers intended to say, by using the words “cruel and unusual,” that punishments generally thought cruel at the time they spoke were to be prohibited—that is, that they would have expressed themselves more
clearly if they had used the phrase “punishments widely regarded as
cruel and unusual at the date of this enactment” in place of the misleading language they actually used. The second reading supposes
that they intended to lay down an abstract principle forbidding whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual. Of course, if the correct translation is the first version, then capital punishment does not
violate the Eighth Amendment. But if the second, principled, translation is a more accurate account of what they intended to say, the question remains open. 30

Thus, Dworkin treats the concepts/conceptions distinction as a
dichotomy inherent in interpretation. He also proposed his own
resolution to this divide. A detailed discussion of Dworkin’s proposed interpretive method is far beyond the scope of this article,
but in short, he argues that we should treat abstract, vague terms
in legal texts like “cruel and unusual” and “equal protection of the
laws” as identifying moral concepts only. 31 To apply those concepts
in our legal framework, interpreters should develop a conception of
those moral values that both represents the “best constructive interpretation” of the governing law and is “continuous in principle”
with the entirety of our country’s legal practice. 32 He termed this
“law as integrity.” 33

27. R. George Wright, What’s Gone Wrong with Legal Theory?: The Three Faces of Our
Split Personality, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371, 374 (1998).
28. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000).
29. See Steven J. Burton, Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism, 73 IOWA L. REV. 109,
109 (1987).
30. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 120.
31. See DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 379–99.
32. See id. at 227, 262.
33. Id. at 227.
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In addition, Dworkin made a historical argument about the concepts/conceptions dichotomy. Namely, he argued that the language
employed by the Framers in the Constitution implies that they
meant to identify concepts, not conceptions. In his view, “[t]he
Framers were careful statesmen who knew how to use the language they spoke,” and “[w]e cannot make good sense of their behavior unless we assume that they meant to say what people who
use the words they used would normally mean to say—that they
used abstract language because they intended to state abstract
principles.” 34 Thus, he concluded, the Constitution’s “‘vague’ standards were chosen deliberately, by the men who drafted and adopted
them, in place of the more specific and limited rules that they
might have enacted.” 35
Dworkin’s historical argument has been attacked ferociously
and frequently. Lawrence Solum is a recent outspoken critic. He
argues that Dworkin’s historical argument rests solely on “armchair speculation” rather than historical evidence, and that such
speculation is not supported by “ordinary discourse.” 36 In Solum’s
view, we normally “use general concept words to express our normative judgments; our use of the words is based on our conception
of the concept.” 37 Thus, he says, “[i]t would be very odd indeed” if,
by telling you to “sell my house at the highest price you can, but do
nothing unfair,” I give you license to employ a selling tactic that I
think wrong under my conception of “unfair” but which you find
unobjectionable under your own conception of fairness or the general moral concept of fairness. 38 Numerous others have criticized
Dworkin’s historical argument as well. 39 Dworkin certainly has his
34. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997).
35. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (1977).
36. See Solum, supra note 24, at 47–55.
37. Id. at 50.
38. See id. at 50–51.
39. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 585 (2013) (opining that Dworkin’s historical claim “rests on shaky
grounds”); Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1040 (1977) (“Dworkin has done nothing to . . . support his claim that the framers were merely offering concepts and not their own conceptions
for guidance, save to note the vagueness of the language they used and the inconvenience
of this approach if one wants to reach the conclusion that capital punishment is unconstitutionally cruel.”); Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface
to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 641 (1985) (“Dworkin’s
pitch for abstract over specific intent (or concepts over conceptions) strikes me, as it has
others, as entirely unpersuasive—at least if understood as the theory about framers’ intent
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defenders, too, but these scholars center their defense of Dworkin’s
“concepts” argument on normative or textual grounds, rather than
historical ones about what the Framers or ratifiers likely intended
when using the words they used. 40
B. The Lockean Perspective
Dworkin’s conceptual stance bears some striking similarities
with the writings of John Locke, which “dominated eighteenth-century views on epistemology and language.” 41 Locke set forth his
theory of language and human understanding in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. He opined that “[w]ords are sensible signs, necessary for communication [of ideas].” 42 Ideas, in turn,
are human constructs used to communicate “sorts and ranks of
things” to others by relating them according to their intrinsic qualities. 43 But owing to their nature as creations of the mind, words
that it usually purports to be.”).
40. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 113 (2010) (“The drafters
and ratifiers of the First Amendment may well have thought that blasphemy could be prohibited; the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that sex discrimination was acceptable. Had the amendments said those things, in terms that could not be
escaped by subsequent interpreters, our Constitution would work less well today. But the
text does not express those specific judgments. As a result . . . we are able to read our own
content into them . . . .”); James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (2013) (“[C]oncrete intentionalism is untenable as a theory of interpretation of our Constitution, which establishes a charter of abstract aspirational principles
and ends and an outline of general powers, not a code of detailed rules.”).
41. See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH. L. REV. 239, 306 n.251 (1989). Hamburger further explains,
Any discussion of the epistemology underlying constitutional language was
most unusual in the late eighteenth century, yet Madison’s analysis [of the
Constitution in Federalist Number 37] is a reminder of Locke’s influence upon
American epistemological thought in that period. Locke’s Essay occupies a
prominent place in surviving, pre-1791 American library lists. It served as a
text at some American schools, and its ideas probably reached other Americans
through Isaac Watts’ Logick of 1725. To the extent that Americans engaged in
epistemological thought about language, including constitutional language,
they began with the remarkable arguments in Locke’s Essay. Perhaps more
important, the Essay contributed much to eighteenth-century American assumptions about language. Thus, Locke’s Essay should be considered together
with the traditions mentioned above as one of the various intellectual influences that probably encouraged Americans—particularly, in the case of the Essay, well-educated Americans—to distrust imprecision and uncertainty in language.
Id. at 305–06 (footnotes and citations omitted).
42. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. III, ch. 2, § 1, at
287 (29th ed. Thomas Tegg 1841) (1690).
43. See id. bk. III, ch. 3, § 11, at 287 (“To return to general words, it is plain, by what
has been said, that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are

CHAPPELL AC 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

CONSTITUTIONAL “CONCEPTS”

12/31/2018 1:54 PM

385

are imperfect vehicles for the communication of objective truths
because they cannot fully convey the full scope of the communicator’s idea. 44 Particularly difficult, said Locke, is the examination of
the meaning of words and the complex ideas they signify in fields
of “the highest concernment” like morality, law, and religion. 45
Nevertheless, Locke contended, when used properly, words can
effectively signal moral truths just as much as they can signal
mathematical certainties or other physical traits demonstrable in
nature. 46 This is so, he said, because moral truths are universal
and discoverable—indeed, just as much as mathematical certainties—through the unique human skill of rational investigation and
logical deduction, which can fill in the gaps left by the imprecision
and volatility of language. 47 Specifically, the remarkable human
capacity of abstraction allows us to group types of things with
shared characteristics into categories according to their general
nature. 48 Hence words—coupled with reason—can effectively convey universal moral truths from one human to another. 49
Aside from its common acceptance in society at the time, there
is limited historical evidence as to whether the Framers had
Locke’s views on language and human understanding in mind
when they drafted the Constitution, though some scholars have
pointed out remarkable similarities of thought in Locke’s views
and those in The Federalist and other contemporary sources. 50
the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern
only signs, whether words or ideas.”); id. bk. III, ch. 1, § 6, at 280.
44. See id. bk. III, ch. 9, §§ 9–11, at 339–40.
45. Id. bk. III, ch. 9, § 22, at 346.
46. See id. bk. III, ch. 11, § 16, at 346 (“I am bold to think, that morality is capable of
demonstration, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence of the things moral
words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the congruity, or incongruity, of the things
themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge.”).
47. See id. (“For were there a monkey, or any other creature, to be found, that had the
use of reason, to such a degree, as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce
consequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense,
be a man, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name.”).
48. Id. bk. III, ch. 8, § 1, at 334. (“The ordinary words of language, and our common use
of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its ideas, and so
they become essences, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished.”).
49. See id. bk III, ch. 11, § 16, at 366 (“The names of substances, if they be used in them,
as they should, can no more disturb moral, than they do mathematical, discourses; where,
if the mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or any other body, he has his clear
settled idea, which varies not, though it may, by mistake, be applied to a particular body, to
which it belongs not.”).
50. See, e.g., JOHN HOWE, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL MEANING IN REVOLUTIONARY
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Though the lack of historical evidence prevents authoritative
claims about Locke’s influence on the Framers’ views on language,
it is still helpful to keep his views in mind as useful historical context, especially as we turn to an examination of our subjects’ interpretive choices.
C. A New Iteration
Dworkin and Locke were not the only ones to propose conceptual
theories of language and law. Most recently, Tara Smith has developed a conceptual theory of her own, which she grounds in objectivist epistemology. 51 In her most recent book, Judicial Review in
an Objective Legal System, Smith explains:
[I]t is crucial to recognize that words designate concepts. Apart from
proper nouns, that is, words stand for concepts and concepts stand for
kinds of things. A word refers to all the discrete instances of things of
the same kind . . . . The point . . . is that a word designates all those
existents that in fact share those characteristics that distinguish
things of that kind (a car, a father, a twin) from things of other
kinds. 52

AMERICA 13–37 (2004) (reporting that Benjamin Franklin cited Locke in support of his proposal to create an Americanized set of “authoritative linguistic standards” to mitigate the
inherent uncertainty in language); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 594 (2011)
(observing that in Federalist 37, “Madison was concisely distilling major elements of John
Locke’s discussion of language in Book III of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding”).
51. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 154 & n.24. For an exposition of the objectivist epistemological stance, see generally AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY
(2d ed. 1990). Rand explains objectivism thusly:
Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distinguishes these units from all other existents within the
field of man’s knowledge. Thus the essence of a concept is determined contextually and may be altered with the growth of man’s knowledge. The metaphysical referent of man’s concepts is not a special, separate metaphysical essence,
but the total of the facts of reality he has observed, and this total determines
which characteristics of group of existents he designates as essential. An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that it does exist, does determine
other characteristics and does distinguish a group of existents from all others;
it is epistemological in the sense that the classification of “essential characteristic” is a device of man’s method of cognition—a means of classifying, condensing and integrating an ever-growing body of knowledge.
Id. at 125.
52. SMITH, supra note 6, at 151–52.
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This means that the objective concepts identified by a word are distinct from the subjective conceptions of that concept the speaker
might have:
[A] word stands for all things of the relevant kind, rather than for
simply the particular concrete instances of that kind with which particular speakers are acquainted or for simply the criteria that speakers employ in determining which things qualify as members of the relevant kind. People’s understanding of the proper criteria for kind
inclusion is fallible. Because words designate things, however, rather
than people’s ideas about things, language’s original users’ correctable
beliefs about the governing criteria are not the appropriate standard
by which to measure words’ objective meaning. 53

This is critical for legal interpretation. Because of the conceptual
nature of language, Smith argues, valid interpretation of a given
law requires “fine-grained discernment” to examine and understand the unique criteria that make up the concepts identified by
its text. 54 This careful logical analysis is both constrained and
guided by contextualizing the text within the framework of the legal system as a whole—the law’s “reason for being” and “authority”—and interpreting it to accord with those fundamental purposes. She explains:
As with objective thought in any sphere, part of what logic requires
for objective judicial review is respect for the relevant context and hierarchy. (I will use “context” to encompass both.) Understanding both
the law’s reason for being and the authority behind the legal system
is crucial to understanding how the government’s power may be exercised and, correspondingly, how its laws may be legitimately understood. Judges must thus understand the essentials of the entire legal
system: its foundations, its function, its powers, and its limits. 55

Thus, Smith insists, “[t]he purpose of a legal system constrains
the rational interpretation of its laws.” 56 Although this approach
might at first glance appear to be a form of purposivism, it is not;
for Smith’s theory of judicial review does not endorse giving purposive policymaking interpretive primacy over the law’s written
text. 57 Rather, her contention is about meaning, rather than interpretive hierarchy: “the letter of a law cannot be understood without
53. Id. at 154 (footnotes omitted).
54. See id. at 215–16.
55. Id. at 225.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 115, 121–38 (setting forth the reasons for “embracing a written constitution as the proper repository of final law” (emphasis added)).
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understanding its spirit—that is, without understanding the animating purpose and principles of the larger system.” 58 Hence,
“[t]he proper understanding of any discrete element of the legal
system rests on an understanding of the system’s overarching substantive mission.” 59
We will soon see that Smith’s treatment of language and her
proffered method of constitutional interpretation are strikingly
similar to those employed by the subjects of our historical examination. Perhaps this can be attributed to Locke’s writings, perhaps
not. Whatever their reasons might have been, many prominent
lawyers who practiced at the dawn of the Republic used an unmistakably conceptual approach in interpreting the Constitution. We
will see some examples of this in the next part.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH IN THE FOUNDING ERA
Now that we clearly understand the concepts/conceptions divide
in the legal-interpretive context, we can turn to the historical record. In this part, we will see that a number of influential foundingera figures—including a Supreme Court Justice, at least one President, and a number of influential lawmakers—employed a conceptual approach to legal interpretation.
A. Justice Cushing
William Cushing is, unfortunately, an often overlooked historical figure. 60 Though he served twenty years on the Supreme Court,
he is often overshadowed by more prominent early Justices like
John Jay, Oliver Ellsworth, and, of course, John Marshall. He has
even been openly derided: one historian remarked dismissively
that “William Cushing served longer with minimal effect than any
of the fourteen Supreme Court justices whose terms overlapped

58. Id. at 226.
59. Id.
60. See Arthur P. Rugg, William Cushing, 30 YALE L.J. 128, 128 (1920) (“The biographical details of one whose life is chiefly spent in judicial service present little of general interest. No startling events challenge the attention. There is no spectacle of an instant leap
from obscurity to fame. Such a life is of necessity one of slow and steady growth, like that of
the oak, ring on ring.”).
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his.” 61 A few others disagree. 62 In any event, Justice Cushing was
an accomplished and widely respected figure in his time. He was a
prominent jurist even among the star-studded Massachusetts bar
in the early days of the republic, a conspicuous Patriot, a friend of
John Adams, and the chair of the Massachusetts ratifying convention that narrowly approved the Constitution. 63 Indeed, so respected was he that President George Washington nominated him
as an inaugural member of the United States Supreme Court, and
then nominated him as Chief Justice seven years later. 64 The Senate confirmed him unanimously. 65
Despite his long career and the number of important positions
he held, Cushing is most commonly remembered for a series of
cases he presided over in the midst of the American Revolution as
Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 66 In
those cases, he opined to the jury that the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 prohibited legal recognition and protection of slavery. 67 His instruction resulted in a legal victory for Quock Walker,
a former slave, and contributed to (or perhaps even directly caused)
the gradual elimination of slavery in the Commonwealth. 68 This

61. Donald O. Dewey, William Cushing, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 127, 127 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994); see also Scott Douglas
Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN
MARSHALL 97, 98–100 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (reviewing numerous negative assessments of Justice Cushing).
62. See Gerber, supra note 59, at 100. Gerber explains:
There have been a few favorable appraisals of William Cushing. Unfortunately, such appraisals are dated and generally neglected. The more one looks
in depth at Cushing’s career, however, the more one becomes impressed. . . .
Succinctly put, there must be reasons that preeminent Founders such as John
Adams and George Washington held William Cushing in high regard for nearly
fifty years.
Id.
63. See generally FLANDERS, supra note 11, at 9–51 (recounting Justice Cushing’s life
and career).
64. Rugg, supra note 60, at 137, 140.
65. Id. at 140.
66. See, e.g., PAUL S. BOYER ET AL., 1 THE ENDURING VISION: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 188 (9th ed. 2018) (including Cushing’s charge to the jury in Quock
Walker’s case in its feature on early African-American legal challenges to slavery).
67. Id.
68. FLANDERS, supra note 11, at 31–32.
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was the first judicial decision in the colonies to hold slavery illegal. 69 During his time on the Supreme Court, Cushing’s most frequently recognized opinion was in Chisholm v. Georgia, 70 in which
he, along with a majority of the Court, held that the Constitution
did not prohibit a citizen of one state from suing another state for
money damages. 71
The unique procedural posture of Quock Walker’s case prevented direct interpretation of a discrete constitutional provision;
nevertheless, Justice Cushing showed his interpretive hand in his
reconciliation of the state’s criminal laws with the governing constitution’s statement of purpose. Cushing yet again exhibited his
conceptual approach—but not squarely—in his correspondence
with his friend, John Adams, about the constitutionality of criminalizing true publications under the Massachusetts Constitution.
Finally, in Chisholm, Justice Cushing brought his interpretive approach squarely to bear in directly interpreting the federal Constitution. In all three instances, Justice Cushing employed a conceptual approach that is worth examining in detail.
1. Quock Walker’s Freedom Struggle
Kwaku, or “Quock,” Walker was born in Massachusetts in 1754
to Mingo and Dinah Walker. 72 When Quock was an infant, James
Caldwell of Worcester County purchased him and his family. 73 At
some point during Quock’s childhood, Caldwell promised to free
him when he turned twenty-four or twenty-five. 74 After Caldwell
died when Quock was ten, his widow told Walker that she would
honor her husband’s promise, and promised Quock his freedom at
age twenty-one. 75

69. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1770–1823, at 508 (1999) (noting that after Quock Walker’s case, “Massachusetts could legitimately claim to be the only state that eradicated slavery by judicial action”).
70. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amentment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
71. Id. at 479.
72. PETER C. HOLLORAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGLAND 443 (2d ed. 2017).
“Kwaku” means “boy born on Wednesday” in Ghanaian. NOEL RAE, THE GREAT STAIN:
WITNESSING AMERICAN SLAVERY (2018).
73. Robert M. Spector, The Quock Walker Cases (1781–83)—Slavery, Its Abolition, and
Negro Citizenship in Early Massachusetts, 53 J. NEGRO HIST. 12, 12 (1968).
74. See id.
75. See id.
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Things changed. The former Mrs. Caldwell soon married Nathaniel Jennison, who had different plans regarding the family’s
slaves. 76 Mrs. Jennison died when Quock was nineteen. 77 Thereafter, when Quock reached twenty-one and accordingly sought his
freedom, Nathaniel refused to honor the Caldwell’s promises. 78 Initially, Quock did not resist, but when he reached age twenty-eight
in 1781, he walked off Jennison’s farm and took a paid job with
John and Seth Caldwell, James Caldwell’s brothers. 79 Jennison did
not acquiesce so easily, however. He tracked Quock down, beat him
violently for fleeing, and locked him in a barn. 80
But Quock Walker was not ready to give up his fight for freedom.
He turned to the courts, suing Jennison for assault and battery. 81
Jennison in turn sued the Caldwells for enticing Walker to flee, to
the detriment of Jennison’s property rights. 82 Subsequently, a
state prosecutor charged Jennison with criminal assault and battery. 83
In the trial court, Walker initially won his assault and battery
suit. The jury found that he was entitled to freedom—it is unclear
whether the jury based its verdict on a contract claim arising from
the Caldwells’ former promises or upon a finding that slavery violated the Massachusetts Constitution—and awarded Walker fifty
pounds in damages. 84 By contrast, the court found in favor of Jennison in his countersuit against the Caldwells. The court awarded
him twenty-five pounds in damages for the Caldwells’ enticement
of Walker to flee his master. 85
The losers appealed in both cases. In Walker’s assault and battery suit against Jennison, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court dismissed Jennison’s appeal because Jennison apparently
committed a fatal procedural mistake. 86 In the Caldwells’ appeal,
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. John D. Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts:
More Notes on the “Quock Walker Case”, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119 (1961).
82. Id. at 120.
83. Id. at 127–28.
84. Id. at 120.
85. Id. at 120–21.
86. See id. at 121–22.
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the court reversed the lower court, finding that Walker was a free
man and hence that the Caldwells were legally entitled to hire
him. 87 Thus, at the end of the day, Walker kept his damages and
the Caldwells were off the hook for hiring him away from Jennison.
Cushing, then the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court,
presided over the criminal case, Commonwealth v. Jennison, 88
which was tried in 1783 (at the time, that court had original jurisdiction over criminal cases). 89 Jennison raised his ownership of
Walker as a defense to the charges, arguing that he was legally
entitled to enforce his property rights in Walker by force, and that
his punishment of Walker was appropriate. 90 The prosecution centered its theory of the case on contract law, presenting evidence
that Walker had been promised his freedom by Caldwell and his
wife. 91
It now fell upon Cushing to present the jury with his opinion on
the legal question, which the jury would decide. He did so forcefully. Because it clearly demonstrates his interpretive thought processes, Cushing’s opinion is worth quoting in full:
As to the doctrine of slavery and the right of Christians to hold Africans in perpetual servitude, and sell and treat them as we do our
horses and cattle, that (it is true) has been heretofore countenanced
by the Province Laws formerly, but nowhere is it expressly enacted or
established. It has been a usage—a usage which took its origin from
the practice of some of the European nations, and the regulations of
British government respecting the then Colonies, for the benefit of
trade and wealth. But whatever sentiments have formerly prevailed
in this particular or slid in upon us by the example of others, a different idea has taken place with the people of America, more favorable
to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural, innate desire of
Liberty, with which Heaven (without regard to color, complexion, or
shape of noses— features) has inspired all the human race. And upon
this ground our Constitution of Government, by which the people of
this Commonwealth have solemnly bound themselves, sets out with
declaring that all men are born free and equal—and that every subject
is entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws, as well as life
and property—and in short is totally repugnant to the idea of being
born slaves. This being the case, I think the idea of slavery is inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution; and there can be no

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 125.
See PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC. 1873–1875, at 293 (1783).
Cushing, supra note 81, at 129.
Id. at 131.
See id. at 131.
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such thing as perpetual servitude of a rational creature, unless his
liberty is forfeited by some criminal conduct or given up by personal
consent or contract . . . . 92

Thereafter, the jury convicted Jennison of assault and battery,
and Cushing accordingly fined him forty shillings. 93
In reaching his opinion, Cushing relied on Article I of the Declaration of Rights contained in the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780. That provision stated, “All men are born free and equal, and
have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their
lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness.” 94
We will soon reflect more deeply on Justice Cushing’s interpretive methodology. For now, however, a few preliminary observations are in order. First, Cushing placed great weight upon the
commonsense meaning of “free and equal.” Second, he treated the
phrase “free and equal” as an abstract concept that was “totally
repugnant to the idea of being born slaves.” Third, he took that
concept at face value, rather than resorting to historical inquiry
into how that concept was applied in the past or deferring to predominant political views of the day. Finally, to develop a construction that accorded with the text, he looked to the structure and
moral authority of government, or, as he put it, the “new idea” that
had taken preeminence over the old of England and had formed
the basis of Massachusetts’ government, to which the people of the
Commonwealth had “solemnly bound themselves” in enacting their
Constitution.
Historians have long debated whether and how much Justice
Cushing’s instruction in Commonwealth v. Jennison contributed to
the extinction of slavery in Massachusetts, with some arguing that
it was the cause of slavery’s demise and others arguing that it
played little or no role. 95 We will leave that debate for others. Here,
92. Document 15: Commonwealth v. Jennison—Charge of Chief Justice Cushing, in
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 45, 45–46 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., 1968).
93. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
45–46 (1975).
94. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. I.
95. See Aaron Schwabach, Thomas Jefferson, Slavery, and Slaves, 33 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 1, 15 (2010) (listing the 1780 Constitution and Cushing’s construction of it in Quock
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our only concern is with the interpretive picture Justice Cushing
painted in his charge to the jury, a picture that would sharpen in
his correspondence with John Adams and his Chisholm opinion ten
years later.
2. Letter to John Adams
Justice Cushing further revealed his interpretive method in his
correspondence with John Adams. Cushing was a friend of his fellow Massachusetts lawyer for five decades. 96 In early 1789, Cushing wrote Adams a letter concerning “libels & liberty of the
press.” 97 The subject of the letter was to solicit Adams’ thoughts on
whether the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 allowed the state
to convict a member of the press of libel of a public official, when
the conduct complained of in the publication was true. 98 Although
he framed his letter as a question, we are fortunate that Cushing
shared his views on the matter as well.
Cushing began by quoting the operative text. In relevant part,
Article XVI stated, “The liberty of the press is essential to the Security of freedom in a state,” and “ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth.” 99 Cushing admitted that he experienced “difficulty about the construction of” this article. 100 He
then reviewed the state of the law in England, observing that it
was clear under the common law that truth was always a defense
to libel in civil suits. 101 By contrast, Cushing observed, “[i]t must
be confessed that, as the law of England now stands,—truth cannot
be pleaded in bar of an indictment, though it may, of a civil action,
for a libel.” 102 Cushing explained that this distinction between
crimina, l and civil libel laws rested on their divergent purposes:

Walker’s case as the causes of slavery’s extinction in Massachusetts); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Racism and American Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1044, 1051 (1974) (book
review) (stating that Quock Walker’s case “effectively abolished” slavery in Massachusetts).
But see Cushing, supra note 81, at 134–39 (concluding that Cushing’s role in Quock Walker’s
case did not play a large role in the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts).
96. GERBER, supra note 61, at 100.
97. Letter from William Cushing to John Adams, supra note 14.
98. Id.
99. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVI.
100. Letter from William Cushing to John Adams, supra note 14.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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But on an indictment for a libel, it is held to be immaterial, whether
the matter of it be true or false. And this law, Judge Blackstone says,
is founded solely, upon the tendency of libels to create animosities &
to disturb the public peace; & that the provocation, & not the falsity,
is the thing to be punished criminally. And some books say, the provocation is the greater—if true. The consequence of all which is, that a
man ought to be punished more for declaring truth, than for telling
lies, in case the truth contains a charge of criminality against any
one. 103

Put succinctly, truth was no defense to criminal libel, because the
purpose of that law was to preserve public order, regardless of the
truth.
Cushing then turned to consider whether the law in England
was “law now, here.” 104 He recalled that the Constitution of 1780
made all English common law that existed at the time of the Constitution’s passage operative in the Commonwealth, “excepting
only such parts as are repugnant to the right & liberties of this
Constitution.” 105 Thus, he took liberty to review the matter de novo
under Massachusetts law. 106
As was his usual method, Cushing began with the text. He did
not spend much time there, however. Observing that the language
in Article XVI was “very general and unlimited,” 107 he quickly
moved to find more detailed answers on how to apply its protections by looking to the structure and purpose of Massachusetts’
government. He noted that “one principle object & end” of government was to prevent the press “from injuring characters.” 108 Thus,
he concluded, Article XVI did not prohibit laws that prevented the
press from “propagating falsehoods.” 109
But, Cushing asked, could the same be said for publishing the
truth? He readily conceded that this was not the case in England.
There, the press received only protection from prior restraint. 110
Indeed, the same exact language—“liberty of the press”—was used
there. Nevertheless, Cushing did not rely on this well-established
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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prior usage of the phrase. Instead, he pointed out that “the words
of our Article, understood according to plain English & common
sense—make no such distinction” between prior restraints and
post-publication restraints. 111 He explained that subsequent restraint could just as easily restrict the “liberty of the press” as prior
restraint, at least according to a commonsense understanding of
the phrase:
[I]f all men are restrained, by the fear of jails, scourges & loss of ears,
from examining the conduct of persons in administration, and, where
their conduct is illegal, tyrannical & tending to overthrow the constitution & introduce Slavery, are so restrained from declaring it to the
public; that will be as effectual a restraint, as any previous restraint
whatever. 112

Hence, Justice Cushing rejected the English conception of “liberty of the press” and looked to develop one of his own that accorded with the fundamental principles that underlay the Massachusetts Constitution. He found those principles in Article XVI’s
prefatory clause, which stated that “[t]he liberty of the press is essential to the Security of Freedom.” 113 In his view, the true question was: “what is that ‘Liberty of the press which is essential to
the Security of Freedom?’” 114
To answer this question, Justice Cushing used logic to carefully
examine the concept of a free press under a government like that
of Massachusetts. He observed that “propagating literature &
knowledge by printing or otherwise, tends to illuminate mens [sic]
minds, & to establish them in principles of liberty.” 115 So too does
pointing out the ways in which government “is subversive of all
law, liberty, & the constitution,” he said. 116 Indeed, he concluded,
the latter form of publication tended “to the Security of Freedom in
a State” more so than the former, which only increased knowledge
in general. 117 Then he moved from abstract to practical, asking
whether the American Revolution would have even been possible

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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without the ability of the press to criticize the unlawfulness of England’s conduct. 118 Finally, he observed that the liberty of the press
to publish the truth about government “can never effectually injure
a good government or honest administrators”; to the contrary, it
could actually “prevent the necessity of a revolution, as well as
bring one about—when it is necessary.” 119 And, he explained, given
that prosecution “with becoming rigour” was available against
those who publish falsehoods, under a free press no “honest man”
would fear the truth; “[t]he guilty only fear it.” 120
Based upon his examination of the idea, or concept, of press freedom within the framework of a government built upon liberty, Justice Cushing concluded that “truth sacredly adhered to, in all cases
without exception can never upon the whole prejudice right religion[,] equal government, or a government founded upon proper
ballances [sic] & checks, or the happiness of society in any respect;
but must promote them all.” 121 Thus, he found that “[s]uppressing
this liberty . . . by penal laws” [would] “carry greater danger to
freedom than it [would] do good to government.” 122
As he had done in Jennison, Justice Cushing demonstrated in
his analysis of the “liberty of the press” a firm commitment to the
commonsense meaning of the constitutional text, coupled with a
logical examination of how the concepts identified by that text applied under the framework of government the people of the Commonwealth created.
3. Chisholm v. Georgia
One more decision by Justice Cushing is worth discussing. This
decision occurred early on in his tenure on the United States Supreme Court, and caused quite the controversy. In fact, it led directly to the first post-Bill of Rights amendment to the Constitution. The case, Chisholm v. Georgia, 123 spurred the states to ratify

118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amentment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
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the Eleventh Amendment in order to expressly preserve their sovereign immunity to suits by citizens from other states. 124 Notwithstanding the controversy over the case’s outcome, Justice Cushing’s seriatim opinion in Chisholm illuminates his method of
constitutional interpretation. It is thus worth reviewing in depth.
In 1790, Alexander Chisholm, executor of Robert Farquhar’s estate, attempted to sue the state of Georgia on behalf of the estate
to recover money for supplies Farquhar gave to Georgia during the
Revolutionary War. 125 Farquhar was a South Carolina resident, so
Chisholm invoked diversity of citizenship to bring the case in federal court. 126 After the federal circuit court declined jurisdiction,
Chisholm appealed to the Supreme Court. 127 Georgia refused to appear, asserting that the state’s sovereign immunity precluded federal jurisdiction over the claim. 128
In a four-to-one decision, the Court held that Georgia was not
immune from the suit because Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution abrogated sovereign immunity in diversity suits. 129 Per the
convention at the time, the Justices all wrote separate opinions.
Justice Cushing agreed with the majority that Georgia could not
invoke sovereign immunity. 130 His interpretive method was consistent with his prior work in Quock Walker’s case and in his correspondence with Adams. Noting that the outcome hinged “not
upon the law or practice of England” or “the law of any other country whatever; but upon the Constitution established by the people
of the United States,” he began, as he always did, with the determinative text:

124. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (stating that the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm “created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first
meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost
unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the States.”).
125. Ian Bartrum, James Wilson and the Moral Foundations of Popular Sovereignty, 64
BUFF. L. REV. 225, 286 (2016); Doyle Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54 J. AM. HIST. 19, 20–23 (1967).
126. See Bartrum, supra note 125, at 286.
127. Id. at 286–87.
128. Id. at 287.
129. Id.; see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429, 450, 453, 466, 469 (1793).
130. 2 U.S. 469 (1793) (opinion of Cushing, J.).
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It is declared that “the Judicial power shall extend to . . . controversies
between two or more States and citizens of another State; between
citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State and
citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects.” 131

Interpreting the plain text, Cushing pointed out that the language granted federal jurisdiction over “controversies between a
State and citizens of another State,” and drew no distinction between “controversies” in which the state was the plaintiff and those
in which it was the defendant. 132 Although he acknowledged that
some would argue that Article III’s drafters did not intend the provision to authorize jurisdiction over cases in which states were defendants (which, given the backlash that ensued after the opinion
issued, was likely a recognition of the popular understanding of the
provision at the time), he asked rhetorically, “[I]f it was not the
intent . . . that a State might be made Defendant, why was it so
expressed as naturally to lead to and comprehend that idea? Why
was not an exception made if one was intended?” 133 Accordingly, he
remarked that Chisholm’s suit “seems clearly to fall within the letter of the Constitution.” 134
Justice Cushing then observed the textual similarities between
the provision authorizing federal jurisdiction over suits between
states and citizens of different states and the provisions granting
jurisdiction over cases between American citizens and foreign
states. He observed that a citizen of a foreign nation could not sue
a state in the United States without abrogation of sovereign immunity. 135 Abrogation, along with the corollary creation of an impartial federal tribunal to decide such cases, was a proper function
of the federal government to prevent international controversies
between the United States and a foreign nation that could result
from a state claiming sovereign immunity from suit by another
country or its citizens as a way to avoid payment of damages. 136 He
observed that prevention of such hostility was “[o]ne design of the
general Government,” because it was “impossible to be conducted,
131.
XI).
132.
XI).
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 466–67 (quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend
See id. at 467 (quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.

CHAPPELL AC 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

400

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:54 PM

[Vol. 53:373

with safety, by the States separately.” 137 Thus, with respect to the
latter provisions, he concluded that “the reason of the thing, as well
as the words of the Constitution, tend to show that the Federal
Judicial power extends to a suit brought by a foreign State against
any one of the United States.” 138
Turning to the provision at issue in Chisholm, Justice Cushing
opined that the same considerations applied with respect to suits
by citizens of one state against another state. He noted that it was
a proper exercise of the federal government to create “a disinterested civil tribunal” to “preserve peace and friendship” between the
states. 139 But he did not stop there. Justice Cushing then looked to
“the great end and object” of state governments. 140 This, he said,
was to “support the rights of individuals.” 141 In light of that ultimate purpose of government, he questioned why the rights and justice due to individuals should be subordinated to those of the
states. 142 Indeed, he argued, “the latter are founded upon the former . . . or else vain is Government.” 143
Cushing then forcefully rejected arguments over the harm to
state sovereignty that would flow from the Constitution’s abrogation of sovereign immunity in diversity suits. He again centered
his arguments on the rights of individuals: “whatever power is deposited with the Union by the people for their own necessary security, is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of
States.” 144 Pointing to various restrictions upon the states included
in the federal Constitution, he observed that they were all “important restrictions” [of state power] “thought necessary to maintain the Union; and to establish some fundamental uniform principles of public justice, throughout the whole Union.” 145 He backed
up this argument with an appeal to reason, stating that the proposition was “self-evident . . . ; at least it cannot be contested.” 146 Finally, he pointed out, “[i]f the Constitution is found inconvenient
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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in practice in this or any other particular, it is well that a regular
mode is pointed out for amendment.” 147 Until then, however, he
was “bound by oath to support it.” 148 With these principles in mind,
Justice Cushing joined the majority in concluding that the Constitution abrogated state sovereign immunity in diversity suits between citizens and states. 149
Justice Cushing’s method of interpreting Article III, Section 2
displayed two overarching themes, both of which can also be readily observed in the previously discussed interpretations. First, he
looked to the linguistic meaning of the provision, and concluded
that its broad language clearly covered diversity suits between citizens and states. Second, to develop a construction of the provision,
he looked, again, to the structure and moral authority of the federal government to which the People had bound themselves. He did
this in spite of the popular public consensus at the time, which apparently understood the provision to apply more narrowly than its
language naturally suggested. 150 Indeed, he encouraged the critics
to change the language if that was the case! 151 This interpretive
method—plain-meaning textualism aided by structural and purposive logical reasoning—appears to have remained constant
throughout Justice Cushing’s long legal career.
B. James Madison
President Madison needs no introduction. Unlike Cushing, his
contributions to the creation of the Constitution and the development of the early Republic are matters of household knowledge.
Much has been written about his views on legal interpretation as
well. 152 Indeed, scholars have revealed the influence of Locke’s conceptual, or “ideational,” theory of language in Madison’s works in
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 469.
150. See Charles S. Hyneman, Judicial Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 2 IND.
L.J. 371, 373 (1927).
151. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 468 (“If the Constitution is found inconvenient in
practice in this or any other particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed out for
amendment. But, while it remains, all offices Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, both of
the States and of the Union, are bound by oath to support it.”).
152. See generally, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1997) (evaluating Madison’s interpretive methods in detail);
Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism,
and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 703 (2006) (discussing
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The Federalist, particularly Federalist 37. 153 However, few have
considered a striking example of the influence of Locke’s conceptual views on Madison’s interpretive thinking: his work for the Virginia House of Delegates in opposing the federal Alien and Sedition
Acts. In that context, Madison drafted a report for the delegates,
commonly known as the Report of 1800, which struck a paradigmatically conceptual tone in interpreting the meaning and reach
of the First Amendment. 154
In relevant part, the Sedition Act of 1798 made it a crime to
“write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States,” or cause or assist in such activities, with the intent to defame. 155 Congress’s passage of this and the other acts comprising
the Alien and Sedition Acts provoked the legislatures of Kentucky
and Virginia to pass resolutions condemning them and declaring
them in violation of the still young Constitution. 156 Madison
drafted Virginia’s resolution. 157
Before Virginia passed its resolution, Madison submitted his report to the House of Delegates. The report contained a remarkably
comprehensive interpretive explanation. After laying out extensive
arguments concerning the federal government’s lack of enumerated authority to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts, 158 Madison
turned to a direct interpretive examination of the right protected
by the “freedom of the press” in order to show that the Sedition Act
was unconstitutional. 159 We will focus here on that portion of the
report. Madison began with the text of the First Amendment,
which has become familiar by now: “Congress shall make no
and advocating for a method of “popular constitutionalism . . . . developed by James Madison
and articulated in essays he wrote as Publius and after”).
153. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
154. In Reason’s Republic, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 522, 557–59 (2016), Evan Bernick
masterfully summarizes the conceptual approach Madison employed in his report. The author owes him much appreciation, as he appears to be the first to have framed Madison’s
method according to the concepts/conceptions framework.
155. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (expired 1801).
156. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 269–70 (2009).
157. Id. at 269.
158. See James Madison, Report on the Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 341, 348–85 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (decrying “forced constructions” of the Necessary and Proper Clause that would allow the federal government to aggrandize power
over subject matters not enumerated and explaining how the Alien Acts violated the Constitution’s separation of powers).
159. Id. at 385–93.
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law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.” 160 He
noted at the outset that Federalists who argued that the Act passed
constitutional muster relied on prior usage—namely, contemporary understanding of the same language under English common
law. 161 But Madison rejected this method of interpretation. He remarked that “[t]he freedom of the press under the common law”
was narrow, “made to consist in an exemption from all previous
restraint on printed publications.” 162 He countered that “this idea
of the freedom of the press can never be admitted to be the American idea of it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications, would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous
restraint on them.” 163 To accept such a conception of press freedom,
he contended, “would seem a mockery” of the right. 164
Moving beyond the First Amendment’s text, Madison, like Cushing, turned to the fundamental principles beneath America’s constitutional government for further illustration. He explained that
“[t]he essential difference between the British government and the
American constitutions will place the subject in the clearest
light.” 165 He observed that in Britain, it was thought that only the
“executive magistrate” (the monarch) presented a serious threat to
the rights of citizens. 166 In contrast, the people’s representatives in
Parliament were understood to be “sufficient guardians of the
rights of their constituents against the danger from the Executive.” 167 Pursuant to that understanding, all of the documents relied on by the British people to preserve their rights were aimed
solely at the monarch. 168 Thus, the British system of government
placed no limitations on parliamentary power. 169 Consistent with
that arrangement, the freedom of the press in England was confined to freedom from prior restraint by executive agents employed
by the King. 170

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 385 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
See id.
Id. at 386 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cf. id.
See id.
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But, Madison observed, “[i]n the United States the case is altogether different.” 171 In America, absolute sovereignty lay solely in
the People. 172 This meant that the powers of both the executive and
legislative branches were limited so as to protect the People’s
rights. 173 Thus, unlike under English law, the “freedom of the
press” should be applied to prohibit both prior restraint and subsequent punishment for publication. 174 “The state of the press,
therefore, under the common law, cannot, in this point of view, be
the standard of its freedom in the United States,” said Madison. 175
Next, Madison used the nature of American government to refute a second argument concerning historical understanding of the
meaning of “liberty of the press.” He cautioned that some would
argue that “the actual legal freedom of the press, under the common law, must determine the degree of freedom which is meant by
the terms, and which is constitutionally secured against both previous and subsequent restraints.” 176 Put differently, some would
argue that the First Amendment only codified that which was already protected at common law—the “original applications” of
press freedom. In Madison’s view, this could not be the case, either.
He pointed out that in England, a fundamental tenet was that the
monarch and the nobles in Parliament obtained their authority
through hereditary acquisition; thus, they did not answer to the
common people at all. 177 Not so in America, said Madison. He argued that “[i]n the United States the executive magistrates are not
held to be infallible, nor the legislatures to be omnipotent; and both
being elective, are both responsible.” 178 In light of this distinction,
he opined, greater press freedom was necessary to ensure oversight
of lawmakers. 179 Indeed, Madison argued that “the practice [of
press scrutiny of legislative conduct] must be entitled to much
more respect” than that afforded to the press in England. 180

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 386–87.
See id. at 387.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 388.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 388–89.
Id. at 388.
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Continuing with his discussion of the concept of press freedom
under the American form of government, Madison pointed out that
there would no doubt be individuals who would abuse the freedom
afforded them. 181 But, said Madison, you must take the bad with
the good:
And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted by any who reflect that
to the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses, the world is indebted
for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason and humanity
over error and oppression; who reflect that to the same beneficent
source the United States owe much of the lights which conducted them
to the ranks of a free and independent nation, and which have improved their political system into a shape so auspicious to their happiness? Had “Sedition Acts,” forbidding every publication that might
bring the constituted agents into contempt or disrepute, or that might
excite the hatred of the people against the authors of unjust or pernicious measures, been uniformly enforced against the press, might not
the United States have been languishing at this day under the infirmities of a sickly Confederation? Might they not, possibly, be miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke? 182

Madison then returned to the constitutional text. He observed that
the First Amendment also contained protections for “[t]he freedom
of conscience and of religion,” in addition to the freedom of the
press. 183 “It will never be admitted,” he argued, “that the meaning
of the former, in the common law of England, is to limit their meaning in the United States.” 184
But these, he said, were not the dispositive arguments. 185 At this
point, Madison returned to his analysis of the federal government’s
authority, rather than on the textual meaning of the First Amendment. 186 Nevertheless, his argument is still worth examining here
because it, too, demonstrated conceptual interpretive principles. 187
He looked for explicit textual assistance to buttress his interpretation. 188 After discussing how concerns about lawmakers adopting
forced constructions of the Constitution to usurp power and infringe the People’s rights motivated the creation and ratification of
the Bill of Rights, Madison called the express statement of purpose
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id.
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in the preamble to the Bill of Rights “still stronger” evidence that
the Constitution prohibited all federal power over the press. 189 The
statement said,
The Conventions of a number of the States having, at the time of their
adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstructions or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added; and as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government will best insure the beneficent ends
of its institution. 190

In Madison’s view, this express statement of purpose was “the
most satisfactory and authentic proof that the several amendments proposed [including the First Amendment] “were to be considered as either declaratory or restrictive . . . and as extending the
ground of public confidence in the Government.” 191 Here, he employed logical reasoning to consider how the concept of “freedom of
the press” should apply under the American system of government:
no construction of the “freedom of the press” clause, he argued,
could further that purpose other than one that removed Congress’s
power to regulate the press entirely. 192
Finally, Madison addressed those who might argue that a total
elimination of Congress’s authority in this area might be an unwise
policy choice. 193 He dismissed that argument: “[T]he question does
not turn either on the wisdom of the Constitution or on the policy
which gave rise to its particular organization.” 194 Instead, said
Madison, “[i]t turns on the actual meaning of the instrument.” 195
To summarize, like Cushing, Madison began with the text,
which he interpreted broadly in accord with its commonsense
meaning. Then, he evaluated how the concept of press freedom
should operate in America’s constitutional system, using logic to
sharpen his view of how it should apply in the “case” before him.
In short, his interpretive approach was remarkably similar to that
of Cushing’s.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 391.
Id.
See id. at 391–92.
See id. at 392–93.
Id. at 393.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In the Report of 1800, Madison incorporated a number of different interpretive techniques. Here, we have focused only on the conceptual approach he utilized in applying the First Amendment to
the Sedition Act. This should not be read as a representation that
Madison used only this approach, nor should it be read as ignorant
to the fact that he was arguing from a political standpoint as well
as an interpretive one. But it should be read as evidence that he
embraced a conceptual theory of language as part of his constitutional-interpretive practice.
C. Lawmakers in the Virginia House of Delegates
Madison was not the only influential lawyer to work on the Virginia Resolution of 1800, nor was he the only one to interpret the
First Amendment conceptually. Members of the House of Delegates debated adoption of the Resolution vigorously, and we are
fortunate to have a comprehensive record of their debates that
spans many pages. 196 Those pages record a bevy of arguments, the
majority of which concern the nature of constitutional sovereignty
and the scope of federal power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 197 Here, however, we will again narrow our focus on the
debates over the meaning of the First Amendment in the context
of the constitutionality of the Sedition Act.
The primary disagreement between Federalists (who supported
the Sedition Act and thought it constitutional) and Anti-Federalists (who opposed it and thought it unconstitutional) went right to
the heart of this article’s subject: the concepts/conceptions dichotomy. Several Federalist lawmakers took what we might today call
an “original expected application” approach to interpretation. 198
They contended that “freedom of the press” was a term of art incorporated from English common law that included a static, relatively narrow set of protections for the press. For example, Archibald Magill of Frederick County 199 argued that “what the doctrines
of the common law were prior to, and at the establishment of the
196. See generally Resolutions and Debate, supra note 19, at 24–161.
197. See generally id.
198. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 222–24 (1980) (identifying and explaining “strict” forms of originalism that seek
to uncover and give effect to how the drafters and ratifying public would expect the Constitution’s provisions to apply in specific cases).
199. Id. at 159.
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Constitution of the United States, must then be the rule, and the
term liberty of the press, as then understood, an important consideration.” 200 To shed light on this original context, Magill “read the
history of the liberty of the press, as laid down by Blackstone, in
the fourth volume of his Commentaries,” which stated that “the
history of the term freedom of the press . . . . was an exemption
from all power over publications, unless previously approved by licensers.” 201 This was simply a prohibition on prior restraint, and
“did not extend to an exemption from legal punishment.” 202 Hence
Magill argued that the Sedition Act did not run afoul of the Constitution: “[t]he freedom of the press, correctly understood, and as
it was considered by the framers of the Constitution . . . was not
abridged by the law.” 203
George K. Taylor of Prince George County 204 advanced a similar
argument, though his analysis centered on the Framers’ intentions, rather than on original understanding of the language. He
argued that the Framers “were certainly men of distinguished abilities and information,” including many lawyers “whose peculiar
study had been the common law.” 205 He speculated that they were
all familiar with Blackstone’s Commentaries, which made clear
that “freedom of the press” in English law “had an appropriate signification, to wit: exemption from previous restraint on all publications whatever, with liability, however . . . for slanders affecting
private reputation or the public peace.” 206 Moreover, he observed
that under the laws of every state, “freedom of the press” meant
what it meant in England. 207 Thus, Taylor asked rhetorically,
“When, then, in the amendments to the Constitution they speak of
‘the freedom of the press,’ must it not be presumed they intended
to convey that appropriate idea, annexed to the term both in England and in their native states?” 208
To summarize, Federalists like Magill and Taylor argued that
the Constitution protected a particular conception of “freedom of
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the press” as it existed at the time of ratification, whether it was
that of the Framers or of the public.
The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, countered those arguments by advocating for a conceptual reading of the First Amendment that was nearly identical to Madison’s. In a lengthy speech,
William Daniel of Cumberland County 209 responded directly to the
Federalists’ common-law reading of the First Amendment. If the
law in America was the same as it was in England, he said that he
“would be glad to be informed for what purpose was it declared by
the Constitution, that the ‘freedom of the press should not be restrained?’” 210 In other words, why didn’t the Constitution mean
what it said?
To this textual argument, he added a purposive one. How, he
asked, were Americans “more free in the United States, than the
people of any other nation whatsoever?” 211 To elaborate, he, like
Cushing and Madison, investigated the concept of press freedom
more closely:
If the press was subjected to a political licenser, the discretion of the
printer would be taken away, and with it his responsibility; and nothing would be printed but what was agreeable to the political opinions
of a certain set of men; whereas subsequent restraints have the same
operation, by saying, if you do “write, print, utter, or publish,” anything contrary to the political opinions, reputation or principles of certain men, you shall be fined and imprisoned. 212

Continuing with his logical investigation, Daniel then considered how the Sedition Act infringed the concept of press freedom.
He noted that while the Act purported to outlaw only that which
was false, “[t]he truth was that it was not the facts, but the deductions and conclusions drawn from certain facts, which would constitute the offence.” 213
To illustrate, he offered an example. Suppose a man stated that
Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. 214 Then, suppose he
stated that passage of the Acts constituted an unconstitutional aggrandizement of congressional and executive power, and that the
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 159.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 95.
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American people should resist them. 215 The first statement was
clearly a true fact, but his follow-up analysis was an “inference or
conclusion” that could not be proven either true or false. 216 Yet,
Daniel argued, because he could not prove the analysis was “true”
to a jury, he could be convicted and imprisoned for printing it. 217
“[P]olitical opinion,” he deduced, “was the real object of punishment.” 218 Thus, he concluded, “the provisions of this act abridged
and infringed the liberty of the press.” 219
Daniel went into an even more detailed logical analysis of why
the Sedition Act abridged the concept of press freedom that is
worth reading in full, 220 but that analysis is too lengthy to discuss
in depth here. However, it is worth noting that he devoted the entirety of his analysis on the concept of press freedom in the American system of government, not on how the Framers or the public
understood it to apply at the time of ratification. 221
John Taylor of Caroline County 222 similarly criticized the Federalists’ narrow interpretation of “freedom of the press.” In his view,
their approach was an “extravagant and unjustifiable mode of construing the Constitution.” 223 The proper mode of construction was
simply to look to the Constitution itself: if the Constitution required looking to Blackstone, “the law of nations, the common law
of England, the laws of the several states, the opinions of English
judges, and the private letters of individuals” to find its meaning,
then, “it had only launched us upon the ocean of uncertainty, instead of having conducted us into a safe and quiet harbor.” 224

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (emphasis omitted).
219. Id.
220. See id. at 94–98.
221. See id. (focusing on the logical reasons why the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of the press led to the conclusion that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional,
not on the Framers’ intended meaning at the time of ratification).
222. Id. at 159.
223. Id. at 118.
224. Id. at 118–19.
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Taylor then examined the concept of press freedom, concluding
that Blackstone’s definition of the right, which the Federalists supported, “wholly quibbles away the liberty of the press.” 225 He observed:
Was it not obvious that the end meditated by the liberty of the press,
can as effectually be defeated in one mode as the other, and that if a
government can by law garble, suppress and advance political opinion,
public information, this great end, upon which public liberty depends,
will be completely destroyed. 226

“Read,” said Taylor, “the Constitution, and consider if this was all
it meant to secure.” 227
The interpretive debates between the Federalist Delegates and
the Anti-Federalists over the Virginia Resolution laid bare the concepts/conceptions dichotomy. The Federalists treated the matter as
wholly empirical. In their view, a historical study of prior usage
would reveal the conception that the Framers or the ratifying public had in mind at the time. This, in turn, would supply the legal
content of the First Amendment. The Anti-Federalists rejected this
method in favor of a conceptual analysis. They relied on the everyday linguistic meaning of the constitutional text to identify a certain right, coupled with contextual analysis and logical reasoning
to examine the nature of that right and how it should apply under
the American system of constitutional government. While the AntiFederalists won that particular battle (the Alien and Sedition Acts
were not renewed), 228 the war still drags on.
In the next part, we will draw out the nature of the disagreement
even more, by looking at the interpretive choices underlying the
conceptual approach and contrasting them with its alternatives.
III. THE INTERPRETIVE CHOICES UNDERLYING THE
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
Now that we have canvassed the use of a conceptual approach in
the founding era, we can turn to a more thorough reflection upon
the interpretive choices that underlay this approach.
225. Id. at 119.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Judith Schenck
Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 827–28
(1984).

CHAPPELL AC 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

412

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:54 PM

[Vol. 53:373

A. Textual Fidelity
All of the historical interpreters began with the constitutional
text, and their ultimate constructions did not run afoul of it.
Clearly then, textual fidelity was crucial to them. Sure, they relied
on a limited set of extratextual considerations to develop their constructions, but they used those considerations to provide context
for the words, not to extend the law beyond them. There was no
talk of penumbral or unenumerated rights; there was only talk of
what the Constitution said.
This was partly because there was no need for talk of such
rights: as Madison’s and Taylor’s comprehensive interpretations
indicate, their fidelity to the Constitution’s textually mandated
structure and the moral principle of individual liberty it was meant
to protect demanded strict limitations on the federal government’s
authority, which in turn foreclosed the need to recognize unenumerated rights. 229 But it was also because they anchored their interpretations in the linguistic meaning of the Constitution’s language. They were textualists at heart. 230

229. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF
LAW 257–83 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing how the Constitution’s limited-government framework protects individual liberty).
230. The concept of “textualism” is itself open to multiple and sometimes incompatible
scholarly conceptions. See generally Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism, 29 J.L. & POL.
309, 310–14 (2014) (discussing various conceptions of textualism and attempting “to identify
and describe what divides Textualists”). Here, this article uses the term “textualist” or “textualism” simply to identify an interpretive method that places ultimate primacy in the
meaning of the law’s words themselves, rather than in what the drafters meant to say. See
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117,
117, 131–32 (2009) (“Textualism’s prime directive—the formalist axiom that statutory text
is the law—fundamentally distinguishes textualism from other interpretive methods.”);
George H. Taylor, Textualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 259 n.3 (1995) (“Textualism
endorses constrained judicial decision based on an interpretation of the language and structure of the text and basically rejects reference to extra-textual evidence such as legislative
history.”).
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However, they were not literalists or strict textualists. 231 Their
constructions were contextual. 232 Consider Cushing’s discussion of
the “liberty of the press” protected by the Massachusetts Constitution. 233 He began with the text and pointed out that the language
was broad, yet he turned to first principles in an attempt to figure
out “what guard or limitation [could] be put upon it.” 234 In other
words, he sought out a reasonable interpretation of the text in the
context of Massachusetts’ constitutional government, not a strictly
literal one that would have treated the right as absolute. He found
that “guard or limitation” in moral principles: since protecting the
People’s reputational rights was “one principle object & end of . . .
government,” it was an acceptable, yet appropriately singular, limitation on the expansive language that squared with valid governmental interests. 235
Moreover, their textualism exhibited a “thin” view of meaning in
that it found the linguistic meaning of the terms underdeterminate
vis-à-vis the provisions’ legal content. 236 Hence, our subjects were
231. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 13 (1995)
(“[S]trict textualism . . . holds that in interpreting a statute a court should confine itself to
a literal—or ‘straightforward’—reading of the relevant canonical text, unless the text is ambiguous on its face or such a reading would lead to an absurd or bizarre result. Subject to
those two qualifications and the use of a dictionary and grammar, all elements outside the
relevant canonical text—for example, the historical condition, that gave rise to the statute,
and propositions of policy, morality, and experience that provide the social context of the
statute or otherwise bear on its subject matter—are inadmissible.” (footnotes and quotation
omitted)).
232. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (“‘Plain meaning’ as a way to understand language
is silly. In interesting cases, meaning is not ‘plain’; it must be imputed; and the choice among
meanings must have a footing more solid that a dictionary—which is a museum of words,
an historical catalog rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures.”).
233. Letter from William Cushing to John Adams, supra note 14.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Lawrence Solum explains the distinction between “thick” and “thin” views of constitutional meaning thusly:
Some originalists may believe that the communicative content of the constitutional text is sufficiently thick (or “rich”) to provide a determinate outcome in
all (or almost all) constitutional cases. For these originalists, the interpretation-construction distinction performs two functions: (1) it provides conceptual
clarity about the (normatively legitimate) role of communicative content in
constitutional practice; and (2) it enables criticism of constitutional constructions that violate the Constraint Principle.
But another group of originalists may believe that the constitutional text is not
fully determinate: they affirm what we can call “the Fact of Constitutional Underdeterminacy.” Constitutional underdeterminacy occurs when the text is (1)
vague, (2) open-textured (in a very broad sense), or (3) irreducibly ambiguous,

CHAPPELL AC 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

414

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:54 PM

[Vol. 53:373

not afraid to move from interpretation to construction when so
warranted. 237 Importantly, however, their constructions did not
overtake the text—they were well within a reasonable reading of
the constitutional language. Thus, the construction phase, which
was augmented by structural and moral principles, was illuminative of the language, not transformative. 238 Contrast this with
stronger forms of purposivism that allow interpreters to “derive or
invent abstract principles from texts and substitute those principles for the words of the text,” 239 or, as we will discuss, so-called
forms of textualism that allow for intentionalism to creep into the
back door under the guise of fidelity to an overly thick conception
of “original meaning.” 240
B. Fixation
Our subjects’ form of textualism is compatible with the “Fixation
Thesis.” 241 Developed by Lawrence Solum, the Fixation Thesis proposes that “[t]he meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when
each provision is framed and ratified.” 242 Solum states that all
forms of originalism are united by their shared acceptance of the
Fixation Thesis. 243 So is the conceptual approach we have witnessed in this article. Here’s how: if our observations are correct, a
necessary implication from our subjects’ method is that the original concepts—or ideas, as Locke would term them—identified by
the Constitution’s language supply the Constitution’s substantive
content. The structural and moral principles, which were themselves fixed by the Constitution’s structure, shape application of
those concepts to particular cases. Thus, all of the applicational
criteria to which the conceptual interpreter looks for interpretive
and when there are (4) gaps or (5) contradictions in the text.
Solum, supra note 24, at 10–11 (footnotes omitted).
237. See id. at 10 (defining “construction” as “the activity of giving the constitutional text
legal effect (either in the form of constitutional doctrine or through the decision of constitutional cases)”).
238. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
919, 932 (1989) (“[T]extualism merely requires that the interpreter obey the statute’s text
above all else, without describing what it means to interpret a text . . . .”).
239. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 873 (2009) (emphasis added).
240. See infra Part IV.C.
241. Solum, supra note 24, at 1.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 6.
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guidance were locked in at the moment of ratification. Those criteria, of course, could not be identified correctly without understanding the original linguistic meaning of the words in context.
Not surprisingly, nothing in the historical record suggests that
our subjects would support the proposition that the meaning of the
Constitution changes over time. Indeed, compelling evidence suggests that the subjects of our historical inquiry would have accepted the Fixation Thesis. Their repeated focus on the historical
context surrounding the Constitution’s enactment 244 refutes this,
for there would be no need to examine this context if the current
context governs. Indeed, the conceptual approach they employed
demanded fidelity to the original linguistic meaning, because the
fixed moral concept signaled by the language would be misidentified if the wrong linguistic meaning was used. 245 To use a modern
example, using the modern meaning of “domestic violence” to interpret the Domestic Violence Clause to “mandate that the federal
government must agree to fund a state’s spousal abuse prevention
program” 246 would have seemed absurd to our interpreters. Such a
reading would be a misidentification of the concept that was fixed
via ratification.
By the same token, giving original, incorrect conceptions primacy over the original concepts would be equally invalid under our
subjects’ methodology. Nor does this run afoul of the fixation thesis. This methodology concerns legal authority, not legal permanency. If a punishment is cruel and unusual according to the concept of “cruel and unusual punishments” 247 as applied to our
constitutional form of government and in consonance with its animating purpose, then it violates the Eighth Amendment, notwithstanding that the public in 1789 thought it did not. There is thus
room for correction of logical error. 248 This does not deny fixation,
244. See, e.g., Letter from William Cushing to John Adams, supra note 14 (“Without this
liberty of the press, could we have supported our liberties against british administration?
Or could our revolution have taken place? Pretty certain, it could not at the time it did.
Under a sense & impression of this Sort I conceive this article, was adopted.”).
245. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 167 (“Remember that language is about: words point to
existents, to the specific instances that a particular word identifies as units of specific kinds
(be those existents physical objects, properties, actions, emotions, relationships, etc.). The
language that people use to express certain ideas represents reality.” (footnote omitted)).
246. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 752
(2011).
247. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
248. Professor Smith explains this point succinctly:
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though, because the governing concept was and is fixed until
amended by proper procedures. The original concept wins when it
and the original conception clash. In such a case, our erroneous
conception has changed, not the fixed, universal concept, which
meant the same thing in 1789 as it means today.
C. Structure and Moral Authority
The observation that the Framers used structural principles to
illuminate their constitutional-interpretation methods is far from
novel. Thirty years ago, Jefferson Powell demonstrated in a celebrated historical study that the Framers interpreted the Constitution “not by historical inquiry into the expectations of the individuals involved in framing and ratifying the Constitution, but by
consideration of what rights and powers sovereign polities could
delegate to a common agent without destroying their own essential
autonomy.” 249 This predominant mode of construction was thus a
form of structural interpretation. 250
Our subjects certainly made structural principles a major part
of their interpretive methodologies, such that it is fair to categorize
them as falling within this structuralist camp. Discussion of these
principles dominated the debates over the Virginia Resolution,
with just one example being Madison’s report to the House of Delegates, in which he devoted the majority of his analysis to examining the power dynamic the Constitution commanded between the
states and the federal government. 251 But their interpretations of
the discrete constitutional provisions we have reviewed here

Even written laws do not make their proper application self-evident. Putting
things in writing does not put them beyond thought; it does not obviate people’s
need to reason, in order to understand and objectively respect the law that is
written. The words used to state a law reflect man’s thoughts about existents
but they do not replace the existents as the fundamental referents of their
words or, as such, as the fundamental determinants of meaning.
SMITH, supra note 6, at 167.
249. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 888 (1985).
250. Id. at 948.
251. See Madison, supra note 158, at 341, 348–85 (decrying “forced constructions” of the
Necessary and Proper Clause that would allow the federal government to aggrandize power
over subject matters not enumerated and explaining how the Alien Acts violated the Constitution’s separation of powers); Powell, supra note 249, at 937 (explaining that Madison
relied on “structural inference” to clarify ambiguity he thought unavoidable due to the “imperfect nature of human communication”).
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demonstrate that in addition to these structural principles, they
also considered more fundamental moral principles—namely, the
proper relationship between the state and the individual. Perhaps
the clearest example of this is Cushing’s discussion of why he
thought Article III permitted citizens to bring diversity suits
against states in federal court. He argued that “the great end and
object” of government was to “support the rights of individuals.” 252
This conclusion was more than just structural; it was a clear argument about the moral authority of the state.
But these were not their personal moral judgments on the proper
relationship between the state and the individual. 253 Rather, they
were values they derived from the governing document, usually
from the plain text but occasionally from implied values. For instance, in his correspondence with John Adams, Cushing observed
that protection of an individual’s reputation was “one principle object & end . . . of government.” 254 He could easily derive this conclusion from the preamble of the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, which stated that “[a]ll men” had “the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties . . . and obtaining their safety
and happiness,” 255 and that “[t]he end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government is to secure the existence
of the body-politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who
compose it with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquility,
their natural rights and the blessings of life.” 256 And structural
principles were part and parcel of these moral judgments: Madison, taking the Constitution’s preamble literally in assuming that
sovereignty was granted to the government entirely by [“t]he People,” argued that both the legislative and executive branches
should be restrained from abridging the People’s right to a free
press in order to preserve their sovereignty. 257

252. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 468 (1793) (opinion of Cushing, J.).
253. This stands in contrast to Dworkin’s proposed interpretive method, which would
give judges freedom to impose their personal moral values into the interpretive enterprise.
See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 3–4 (1996) (arguing that judges should interpret the Constitution according
to their “own views about political morality,” and not according to “metaphorical” considerations like “historical ‘intentions’” or “constitutional ‘structure’”).
254. Letter from William Cushing to John Adams, supra note 14.
255. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. I.
256. Id. pmbl.
257. See Madison, supra note 158, at 388.
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In sum, while our subjects’ approaches were firmly rooted in textual fidelity, such that they can fairly be called “textualists,” they
supplemented their textual methods with both structural and
moral considerations. Importantly, however, those considerations
were derived, expressly or impliedly, from the Constitution itself,
not from their subjective personal views.
D. Reason
Our subjects all made reason the heart of their interpretive practices. The knee-jerk reaction to this observation might be, “Of
course, what method doesn’t employ logical reasoning? That’s the
primary skillset required of a lawyer.” But the conceptual approaches they took employed reason in a way that differs subtly,
yet importantly, from others.
Our interpreters rigorously applied logical reasoning to determine how the laws or practices they analyzed squared with the
concepts identified by the Constitution’s language. They did so
from both concept-facing stances and government conduct-facing
stances. They considered how the constitutional concept at issue
should operate within the framework of the government the Constitution created, and, based upon that framework, what, if any,
“guard or limitation [could] be put upon it.” 258 This was done by
considering both the government’s delegated power over the subject matter (the structural inquiry) and its moral authority to limit
the concept (the moral-purpose inquiry). Then, they analyzed
whether the challenged measure overstepped its bounds in either
regard or furthered those aims.
It bears mentioning that this type of reasoning was also central
to Locke’s theory of language, which might have influenced our
subjects’ understanding of legal texts. 259 Locke opined that while
words identify ideas in the mind of the speaker that only the
speaker can access, 260 those ideas, or concepts, are incomplete human creations used to organize and categorize objective truths that
258. Letter from William Cushing to John Adams, supra note 14.
259. See Bernick, supra note 154, at 555 (“There is compelling evidence that the Framers
embraced a conceptual theory of language. Their writings disclose the influence of John
Locke’s epistemology, as set forth in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.” (footnote omitted)).
260. LOCKE, supra note 42, bk. III, ch. 2, § 2, at 281 (“The use men have of these marks
being either to record their own thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory or, as it
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exist independent of human conception. 261 In other words, words
categorize objective truths by “sorts and ranks of things.” 262 Thus,
the true and complete definition of the concept identified by a word
or group of words is discoverable through rigorous application of
reason—specifically, careful examination into “what the sorts and
kinds” of things are signified by linguistic terms, “wherein they
consist, and how they come to be made.” 263
Whether Locke’s writings directly influenced our subjects or not,
the evidence demonstrates that their views of language were remarkably similar. Their conceptual interpretations manifested the
logical investigation of the type Locke discussed: these approaches
rested upon inquiry into the “sorts and kinds” of things identified
by the Constitution’s words and phrases—“wherein they consist,
and how they come to be made”—and assumed that such investigation can supply both a constraining principle and an effective
way of applying the Constitution to particular cases. 264 The empirical part of their analyses was limited at best, looking only to the
original linguistic meaning of the text and the public history that
shed light onto the structure and moral theory that underlay the
Constitution’s government. The brevity here was partly due to immediacy: they interpreted their constitutions only a few years after
they were enacted. But even if they had been interpreting today,
the limited scope of their historical inquiry would have made the
empirical phase pass by relatively quickly.
were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words, in their primary
or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses
them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which
they are supposed to represent.”).
261. Id. bk. III, ch. 3, § 11, at 287 (“To return to general word, it is plain, by what has
been said, that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things ; but are the
inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only
signs, whether words or ideas.”).
262. See id. bk. III, ch. 1, § 6, at 280.
263. Id. Locke’s full statement is as follows:
Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not particularly for
this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things; it will be necessary
to consider, in the next place, what the sorts and kinds, or, if you rather like
the Latin names, what the species and genera of things are; wherein they consist, and how they come to be made.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
264. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 167 (“A word’s meaning and people’s beliefs about a
word’s meaning are two different things. . . . Remember that language is about: words point
to existents, to the specific instances that a particular word identifies as units of specific
kinds (be those existents physical objects, properties, actions, emotions, relationships, etc.).
The language that people use to express certain ideas represents reality.” (footnote omitted)).
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Contrast this with other theories that treat original conceptions
as the governing applicational criteria. They treat the judge’s role
as purely empirical: he is a robed historian tasked solely with
searching and sorting the documentary record for evidence of how
whoever has legal authority under their chosen theory—the Framers, the original public, etc.—would have understood the language
to apply. 265 Of course, the judge might often use logic and reason
to draw inferences or conclusions about the full scope and import
of the conception being studied. 266 But used this way, logic and reason is an auxiliary tool, rather than the central component, of the
judge’s in deciding the constitutional case before him.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS: THE NORMATIVE CLAIM
We can now briefly shift from a historical argument to a moral
one. Using our observations on the interpretive choices that underlay our subjects’ conceptual view of the Constitution, we can make
out a preliminary sketch of the conceptual approach’s normative
claim. A full exposition will take far more pages than we have left
here, 267 but we can at least begin. Here’s the gist: by relying on the
Constitution’s text, its structure, and the moral authority that can
be derived logically from those objective criteria, the conceptual approach presents a picture of the Constitution as a coherent, harmoniously functioning charter of government. This pays fidelity to
the Rule of Law and allows judges to escape the intentionality trap
that forces other interpretive approaches that rely on particular
conceptions of the Constitution’s provisions to stray from the document as it was actually written and ratified.
A. Textual Fidelity Is Fidelity to Democracy and the Rule of Law
As Cushing, Madison, and the lawyers in the Virginia House of
Delegates all demonstrated, the conceptual inquiry begins and
ends with the constitutional text. This textual fidelity makes out
two normative claims worth discussing here. The first is fidelity to
democracy, and the second is fidelity to the Rule of Law.
265. J. HARVEY WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 45 (2012) (“If the
courts are merely enforcing the Constitution as the Framers intended, then the legitimacy
problems should be directed at the Constitution itself, not the judicial messengers.”).
266. See id. at 43 (“Originalist constitutional interpretation bears remarkable similarities to interpretation of statutes, precedents, contracts, and other legal sources that judges
work with every day”).
267. For a far more comprehensive examination of the moral justification for a conceptual approach, see generally SMITH, supra note 6.
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1. Textual Fidelity as Respect for Democratic Self-Governance
The first dimension relates to compatibility with democratic selfgovernance. By its plain terms, the Constitution vests sovereign
authority in “the People.” 268 And by its plain structure, it actuates
this sovereign authority by filtering the People’s will through the
instrument of representative republicanism. 269 This has important
repercussions for judicial review: put succinctly, the act of ratifying
the constitutional text was a democratic exercise, while the act of
interpreting that text is not. 270 Thus, a method of interpretation
that hews as closely as possible to the actual exercise of democratic
will pays greater fidelity to the democratic form of government that
the Constitution created and was designed to protect.
Textualism does this, because the text of the law—not subjective
mental intentions, legal traditions, or individual moral values—
was voted on and approved. But there is a deeper level of nuance
to consider. Recall that we found that the conceptual approach embraces a “thin” version of meaning, in that it accepts the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text as an identification of the concept behind the language as well as a limitation upon the interpretation of the provision. 271 This thin view of meaning pays greater
fidelity to democratic self-government than does a “thick” view of
textualism. In the first phase of the conceptual approach, the
“meaning” phase, a judge will attempt to understand the commonsense meaning of the constitutional text at the time of the enactment, because this language identifies the governing concept.
To do so, he will not look to technical or hidden meanings, such as
legal conceptions or applications, of the words. Thus, owing to its
acknowledgement that language is an imperfect vehicle for identifying the objective truth behind the words, 272 the conceptual approach relies on a rather superficial understanding of the text before turning to a different, limited set of interpretive tools in the
construction phase. But in addition to accounting for language’s
shortcomings, it also acknowledges another inconvenient truth: it
268. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
269. See generally id. art. I.
270. See Andrei Mamor, Textualism in Context 4 (USC Gould School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 12-13, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2112384
[https://perma.cc/Z3GN-JJAH].
271. See supra notes 236–40 and accompanying text.
272. LOCKE, supra note 42, bk. III, § 9, at 286; see also FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The use of words is to express ideas. . . . But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as
not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas.”).
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reflects, and attempts to account for, the inevitable degree of political ignorance inherent in our system of democratic self-government. 273
The vast majority of the ratifying public—those with legal authority to create the Constitution, at least according to the plain
language of its Preamble—were not lawyers or legislators, and
they lacked education or training on how to apply legal texts to
specific cases and factual scenarios. 274 So, what does this mean for
legal interpretation? As an empirical matter, it suggests strongly
that the public who supported the Constitution viewed its provisions in a general sense rather than in terms of specific applications. For example, the average citizen in 1789 would understand
the simple, general meaning of the words “freedom of the press”—
in other words, that it protected the idea of a free press—but likely
would be ignorant to particular conceptions of that freedom as they
existed historically under English law. 275 Nor would most of those
citizens have thought extensively about which conception would
best further the concept they were enacting.
The conceptual approach’s “thin” version of textualism incorporates this reality into the interpretive enterprise. It places ultimate
primacy on the original meaning of the Constitution’s words, but it
does not hesitate to move from interpretation to construction when
the text is underdeterminate. It does so because it treats the text
the same way as the original public would—as identifying broad,
abstract concepts that can only be further fleshed out in concrete
cases by additional construction. It does not attempt to apply the
Constitution’s provisions by over-interpretation of the text to divine a narrow, historical conception of the rights enumerated. This
is far more consistent with the notion that the People—rather than
the People’s lawyers or the People’s representatives—created the
Constitution and the underlying form of government it was written

273. For a detailed discussion of the problem of accounting for political ignorance in constitutional interpretation, see generally Somin, supra note 5. Somin examines contemporary
evidence on political education and posits that “the public may well have been poorly informed about many constitutional issues at the time of ratification.” Id. at 629. He therefore
cautions that interpretive theories that rely on fidelity to original meaning “must take account of the problem of political ignorance.” Id. at 628.
274. See Paulsen, supra note 239, at 875 (“Whoever ‘We the People’ is/are, these words
plainly describe a public persona. The Constitution’s meaning is not secret, the private province of some clandestine order, or accessible only to an elite class of high priests who serve
as stewards of the document. The Constitution’s words’ meaning are their public meaning,
not any hidden meaning. They are the publicly spoken words of the people.”(emphasis omitted)).
275. See Somin, supra note 5, at 628.
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to preserve. 276 This is so because it attempts to understand the
words in the same way as the People would have understood them:
as broad, generalized statements of principle.
Consider the converse. Given that the People who enacted the
Constitution likely thought of the document as a broad statement
of principle, eschewing the Constitution’s overarching principles in
favor of how someone—the Framers, jurists of the day, or some illdefined segment of the population—thought it should apply in this
case or that essentially treats the Constitution as a deceitful document. 277 Though its provisions bespeak objective criteria (stating
that “due process of law” is required, rather than “the procedural
protections thought to constitute due process of law under the laws
of England on Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven
hundred and eighty nine”), a “conceptions” approach accepts as
given that the words can never have intrinsic meaning, because
they can never be considered according to objective criteria. They
can only be examined according to subjective criteria, namely, the
words as applied by whoever the interpreter deems to have the authority to make his view of what satisfies those criteria authoritative until amended. 278 Under this view, the “People’s” Constitution
can never really mean what it says.
276. See RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 31–51 (2016) (discussing the Framers’ view that a
form of government vesting ultimate sovereignty in “We the People” would more effectively
protect the populace’s individual than would purely democratic or republican forms of government that vested ultimate authority in the legislature).
277. See Paulsen, supra note 239, at 873 (“What spare language there is in the Constitution all tends to reinforce the natural inference that the text’s meaning is its objective,
public, original meaning and that the Constitution does not invite, and indeed forbids, interpreters from assigning to its words secret, private, idiosyncratic, shifting meanings. Nor
does it permit interpreters to derive or invent abstract principles from texts and substitute
those principles for the words of the text.”(emphasis omitted)).
278. See Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 558 (2009) (“[T]extualism looks to the plain text of the statute and asks whether the plain meaning of the text
unambiguously resolves the case. If it does, then the textualist stops there and applies the
text according to that clear meaning. For example, if a textualist were asked whether a
statute stating that ‘no dogs are allowed in the park’ prohibits bringing a cat into the park,
he would say clearly not. He would read the statute, which by its plain terms does not apply
to cats, and stop there. Any reasonable person would do the same because the scope of the
prohibition—though perhaps not clear as applied to all circumstances—is clear as applied
to this circumstance. To read the term ‘dogs’ to include ‘cats’ would require the reader to
move from the text itself to the potential purposes behind the prohibition, or perhaps into
the realm of desirable policy. At that point, however, the reader’s interpretation would no
longer reflect the most widely shared and commonsense interpretation of the text. Rather,
it would reflect the judgment of that particular reader. The same is true when a judge employs purpose or bald policy to stray from the text of a statute—he potentially subjects citizens to his own personal interpretation of the rule, rather than the most widely shared and
reasonable interpretation.”(footnote omitted)).
AND

CHAPPELL AC 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

424

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:54 PM

[Vol. 53:373

This is not the only empirical problem with relying on the original conceptions of a right. Doing so invites the ages-old, yet stilldevastating criticism that there really isn’t such thing as a singular “original” conception of a right. 279 Justice Scalia famously
opined that the “original meaning” of the Constitution’s provisions
includes the “moral values” of the generation that ratified it. 280 But
this conception of the text’s “original meaning” is incredibly elusive. Consider the Equal Protection Clause. The linguistic meaning
of the words “equal protection of the laws” is largely unchanged
from its meaning in 1868. But looking beyond that linguistic meaning into how the “moral values” of the general public in 1868 would
have dictated the result in a case today is an empirically impossible
proposition. The nation was starkly divided in those days, having
just emerged from the Civil War. Southern states were offered the
Hobson’s choice of either ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment or
being denied readmission into the Union, the result of which would
be military occupation and governance. 281 Not surprisingly, debate
and discussion over the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, or the
“moral values” behind that meaning, was limited or non-existent
in the records of many southern ratification proceedings. 282 So it is

279. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 198, at 212–22 (eviscerating the proposition that accurately recovering original expected applications of the Constitution’s provisions is a feasible
exercise). Brest explains,
The act of translation required [in attempting to divine original expected application] involves the counterfactual and imaginary act of projecting the
adopters’ concepts and attitudes into a future they probably could not have
envisioned. When the interpreter engages in this sort of projection, she is in a
fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters’ making.
Id. at 221.
280. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 146 (emphasis added).
281. See JAMES EDWARD BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 5 (1997).
282. See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2011). Calabresi and Rickert observe:
In reality, America’s unusual post-Civil War political situation complicated
state legislatures’ discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s propriety,
meaning, and scope, and undoubtedly confused the public. The struggle between North and South, Republicans and Democrats, and federal and state
authorities frequently dominated discussion of the Amendment, and in Southern legislatures, insidious prejudice and wounded pride sometimes led them to
refuse to discuss the merits of the Amendment at all.
Many of the states that did consider the Amendment at length did not record
the debates in detail. For the most part, we are left with governors’ addresses
and committee reports, which sometimes and to some degree illustrate how the
proposed amendment was understood. The bulk of objections to ratification
rested on states-rights arguments, at least nominally. The indisputable fact
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likely safe to assume that the officials in the southern states’ ratifying conventions—and, more importantly, the public they represented—possessed “moral values” that starkly opposed ratifying
the clause at all, regardless of meaning. From their perspective,
ratification was purely strategic. 283 By contrast, other ratifiers appeared to impute values far more liberal into the Equal Protection
Clause, such that widely practiced customs in operation at the time
of its enactment would be prohibited. In 1872, Charles Sumner,
one of the Fourteenth Amendment’s architects, decried the ubiquitous practice of segregation in the South:
[It is] vain to argue that there is no denial of Equal Rights when this
separation is enforced. The substitute is invariably an inferior article. . . . Separation implies one thing for a white person and another
thing for a colored person; but equality is where all have the same
alike. 284

So, under an interpretive approach that purports to pay fidelity
to “original public meaning,” but in truth relies on original conceptions of the right, whose moral values, or conceptions, govern? 285
By contrast, the conceptual approach tries to square the generality in the Constitution’s most difficult provisions with the objective criteria those words suggest. It neither seeks out someone’s
that the Fourteenth Amendment increased the power of Congress at the expense of the states gave pause even to some in the North. But the wildest pronouncements came from Southern anti-Amendment forces seeking to discourage ratification. They ranged from claims that the Amendment would give
Congress plenary power over the states to warnings that Southern Democrats
would be made permanently powerless. Governor Thomas Swann of Maryland
explained that Section Five “may leave the Southern and Border States at the
mercy of the majority in Congress, in all future time,” which he found “subversive . . . of every principle of justice and equality among the States, and in
times of high party excitement and sectional alienation, dangerous to the liberties of the people.” Others in the South took a more practical view, recognizing that ratification of the Amendment was the only path back to representation in Congress: they argued for it solely on that ground.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
283. See id.
284. Id. at 42–43 (alterations in original) (quoting Sumner in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
2d Sess. 382–83 (1872)).
285. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is empty. Peer inside the heads of legislators
and you find a hodgepodge. Some strive to serve the public interest, but they disagree about
where that lies. Some strive for re-election, catering to interest groups and contributors.
Most do a little of each. And inside some heads you would find only fantasies challenging
the disciples of Sigmund Freud. Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective
body. The different strands produce quite a playground—they give the judge discretion, but
no ‘meaning’ that can be imputed to the legislature.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
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particular conception of “free exercise of religion” as the authoritative view of the matter, nor does it permit the judge to make his
own views of what constitutes the “free exercise of religion” authoritative. Instead, it seeks out objective criteria: under the idea of
government to which the people of America have bound themselves, is the challenged government action compatible or incompatible with the concept of the “free exercise of religion”? In doing
so, it relies on that which the People enacted in both the “interpretation” and “construction” zones. In the interpretation zone, it obtains the original, commonsense linguistic meaning of the text,
which is all that was ratified. Then, it shapes application of the
concept identified by that text in accordance with the type and
structure of government the people ratified. At every stage, then,
the interpreter relies on applicational methodology derived directly from the exercise of democratic will.
2. Textual Fidelity as Commitment to the Rule of Law
The conceptual approach’s commitment to the Constitution’s
text furthers the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law is a crucial ingredient in a legal system that accepts fairness as a core moral value
and, accordingly, rejects arbitrary rule as morally unacceptable. 286
It requires, among other things, legal rules to be presented to the
public with sufficient clarity to provide notice, and that those rules
be applied in particular cases according to objective, neutral criteria. 287 This is because advance understanding of the content of law
and how it will apply provides fair notice to a polity’s citizens of
their rights and duties under the law. 288
286. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 79 (“[T]he rejection of arbitrary rule is central to the
Rule of Law’s appeal.”).
287. See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (stating that the
Rule of Law mandates “that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances”); Robert S. Summers, The
Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1691, 1693–94 (1999) (listing, among
the requirements of the Rule of Law, that “all forms of law be appropriately clear and determinate in meaning” and “that a form of law be interpreted or otherwise applied in accord
with an appropriate, uniform (for that type of law), and determinate interpretive or other
relevant applicational methodology, itself a methodology duly respectful of the expressional
form and content of that type of law”).
288. See Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 278, at 543 (“From the inception of
Western culture, fair notice has been recognized as an essential element of the rule of law.
Most importantly, the American Founders and the Enlightenment thinkers who influenced
them viewed fair notice as a requirement for fairness, legitimacy, and social utility.”).
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Multiple scholars have advocated for textualism as the best
method of interpretation for upholding the Rule of Law, 289 which
is unsurprising given that textualism gives ultimate primacy to
law’s language, the most public interpretive cornerstone available.
Textual fidelity in interpretation is simply an extension of the more
fundamental principle that written law is essential to the Rule of
Law. Smith explains that written laws represent “[b]edrock [l]egal
[a]uthority.” 290 She observes that a written constitution, “[w]hen
properly made . . . translates the mission and moral commitments
of a government into legal practice by using those commitments to
establish the government’s specific powers and the boundaries
around those powers.” 291 Without this fixed, written authority, says
Professor Smith, the Rule of Law inevitably yields to the powerful
coercive pressure of the rule of men, for “[l]aw’s identity is pliable,
in ceaseless flow, evolving in ways that widen, narrow, reverse,
leap ahead, or veer off along extraneous, tangential paths.” 292 Textualism is an extension of this principle: when law’s content is anchored firmly to law’s language, the citizenry can use law’s language to reasonably predict its application, and can thus order its
affairs in accordance with the legal framework.
Thus, unlike a common-law system or any other system that allows for ex post facto “evolution” of law by a means other than public amendment to the written law, a system of written laws furthers the Rule of Law by providing prospective notice of the legal
system’s structure and its basic requirements. But a written system cannot do this alone: without a firm anchoring of the law’s content to the law’s words, the Rule of Law must inevitably give way
to retrospective, and thus arbitrary, changes in law’s content according to evolving conceptions. 293
The conceptual approach allows law’s content to be anchored to
law’s language. As discussed, the approach is textualist at heart,
289. See, e.g., id. at 558 (“Textualism’s entire analytical framework is set up to reach the
interpretation of the text that most accurately reflects how citizens would understand it.”);
Scalia, supra note 2, at 17 (“[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the
lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. That seems to me one step
worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the
pillars, so that they could not easily be read.”).
290. SMITH, supra note 6, at 112–13.
291. Id. at 113.
292. Id. at 124.
293. See id. at 167.
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and nothing about conceptual interpretation would allow the linguistic meaning of constitutional provisions to change with time. 294
Indeed, the first step of the conceptual approach is to examine the
linguistic meaning of the words employed at the time of enactment
to identify the concept that the language originally identified, and
to constrain application of the provision to that original concept. 295
This approach thus furthers the Rule of Law by anchoring law’s
content to law’s language.
B. Reason as the Rule of Law
At this point, a critic might point out that we have only covered
the easy part thus far. Surely, textual fidelity furthers the rule of
law in the abstract, but the reams of paper written and gallons of
ink spilled on trying to solve the problem of constitutional interpretation demonstrate that the Constitution’s language makes textualism an incomplete solution at best. Put simply, the Constitution’s text—namely, its broad, abstract language—got us here in
the first place. But we should pause to reflect upon the considerable work we have already done.
With respect to Rule of Law considerations, we have, in fact, put
considerable distance between the conceptual approach and other
approaches. Many competing approaches that look to divine legislative or public intent, and many forms of living constitutionalism,
cannot make an equal claim to furthering the principle of fair notice. To do so would be impossible, because all of those approaches
give primacy to some subjective value over the objective meaning
of the Constitution’s words. For example, the pragmatic approach
requires a policy analysis to determine which interpretation would
provide the most social utility. 296 To that end, a pragmatist judge
must necessarily choose a reading of the Constitution that he
thinks will produce the best public outcome over one required by

294. See supra Part III.A.
295. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 166 (“[C]ontemporary interpreters must honor the same
concept insofar as we may not substitute a different one (for example, by reading a law’s
reference to ‘banks’ to designate land bordering a body of water when the context makes
clear that it was used to designate certain financial institutions, or reading a law’s reference
to ‘gay behavior’ to designate a lighthearted manner of action when the context clearly indicates its reference to homosexual activity).”).
296. WILKINSON, supra note 265, at 82.
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its language. Thus, we have shown already that the conceptual approach stakes out a normative claim much different from other,
non-textualist approaches when it comes to the Rule of Law.
Versions of originalism that look to original meaning fare better
in this regard, because they accept the fixation thesis and the corollary “[c]onstraint [p]rinciple,” both of which bind the content of
law to its original meaning. 297 But there is also marked distance
between many “original meaning” approaches that still rely on
original conceptions and the conceptual approach (which itself embraces a version of original meaning) because the conceptual approach furthers the Rule of Law in ways that those approaches
cannot. Specifically, the conceptual approach makes reason, rather
than historical inquiry, the heart of interpretive practice.
Recall that written law (which includes the corollary principle of
textual fidelity) is only one ingredient to the Rule of Law. While
textualism alone can provide fair notice in some cases, more is
needed when the text being examined is abstract. Indeterminate
phrases like “the free exercise of religion” bespeak indeterminate,
open-ended moral and legal concepts, rather than fixed applications. So what other considerations, if any, can further the Rule of
Law when the written law’s language makes its application unclear?
In such a case, valid applicational methodology can mitigate lack
of textual specificity. Robert Summers explains that to comport
with the Rule of Law, “a form of law [must] be interpreted or otherwise applied in accord with an appropriate, uniform (for that
type of law), and determinate interpretive or other relevant applicational methodology, itself a methodology duly respectful of the
expressional form and content of that type of law.” 298 In other
words, “a well-formed methodology of statutory interpretation
channels the exercise of reason into the construction and articulation of instances of those general types of arguments that are themselves authorized by the accepted general methodology of interpretation.” 299 So when the meaning of law’s words is unclear, the Rule
of Law requires consistency and reason in the “construction

297.
298.
299.

Solum, supra note 24, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
Summers, supra note 287, at 1694.
Id. at 1706.

CHAPPELL AC 532 (DO NOT DELETE)

430

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 1:54 PM

[Vol. 53:373

zone.” 300 Lawyers, and the citizens they represent, must clearly
know the rules of the game.
By placing reason and logic at the center of the interpretive exercise, the conceptual approach our subjects employed provides
such a valid applicational methodology. It requires the interpreter,
who has identified the constitutional concept signaled by the text,
to rigorously examine that concept’s application under the system
of government created by the Constitution. In doing so, it honors
the Rule of Law’s requirement of a valid, reliable applicational
methodology, and it does so more effectively than approaches that
depend upon divining original conceptions. This is so for multiple
reasons. First, it rejects the often unreliable and easily manipulable methodology of performing extensive historical research to uncover the predominant conception of a provision that existed at the
time of the Constitution’s ratification. In contrast to those conceptions, which are deeply obscured by the mists of history (assuming
they were ever ascertainable), the original structure of the government and the limits of its powers are self-evident from the face of
the Constitution, and the theory of its moral authority is easily derivable from that structure via natural implication. 301 This means
that the empirical pitfalls associated with researching historical
conceptions are far more limited under the conceptual approach.

300. Lawrence Solum coined the term “construction zone” in this context. He explains it
thusly:
Irreducible ambiguity, vagueness, contradictions, and gaps create constitutional questions that cannot be resolved simply by giving direct effect to the
rule of constitutional law that directly corresponds to the communicative content of the constitutional text. Such cases are underdetermined by the meaning
of the text—they are in the construction zone.
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
471 (2013).
301. See Bernick, supra note 154, at 562–63. Bernick explains:
The American Constitution is not a treatise in political philosophy but a plan
for constituting a particular government. Nonetheless, it is designed to implement a political philosophy and that political philosophy is evident in its design, content, and structure. The Constitution’s preamble announces that it is
designed to “secure the blessings of liberty”—not to grant them—and even the
unamended 1787 Constitution contained a number of explicit safeguards for
individual rights. The separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers,
the division of the national legislature into two houses, and the distribution of
power between the federal government and the states, among other components of the Constitution’s structure, serve to prevent any governmental entity
from attacking individual rights unopposed.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Far more importantly, however, logic and reason do not require
specialized training or skills to evaluate. Assuming there is enough
historical evidence to do the job effectively, an “original conceptions” approach relies on extensive research performed by specially
trained historians and lawyers who have the time to dedicate to
the task. 302 But logical reasoning is universal. A reasonably informed and intelligent citizen of any vocation who seeks to understand his rights under the Constitution and his government’s consequent limitations can examine the structure it sets forth and
apply critical thinking to predict how it will likely apply to particular circumstances. No legal training is necessary, nor is the time,
training, and intense effort involved with sorting through centuries-old legal commentaries and corpora in an attempt to incorporate the Framers’ or the original public’s subjective conceptions of
how the Constitution should apply. Moreover, the form of structural and moral reasoning demanded by the conceptual approach
establishes the default assumption that the American system of
laws is a coherent, harmoniously functioning system structured
around protecting a central aim 303—individual liberty. Such is a
natural and fair assumption any reasonable citizen can make when
trying to understand how the law will function in an area where
the law’s boundaries are unclear. 304
Of course, this does not mean that the conceptual approach offers perfect fair notice. No method could: the Constitution’s broad
302.
303.

WILKINSON, supra note 265, at 50–52.
See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Coherence in Legal Justification, in 176 THEORY OF
LEGAL SCIENCE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON LEGAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE, LUND, SWEDEN, DECEMBER 11–14, 1983, at 235, 235 (Alexander Peczenik et al.
eds., 1984) (explaining that “[c]oherence in reasoning is one important test of its soundness
as reasoning,” and that “[i]n the specific context of legal justification,” coherence demands
both “normative coherence” and “narrative coherence”).
304. As Jeremy Waldron explains:
[A] legal system is not just a succession of legislated norms . . . . [T]here is a
felt requirement essential to law that its norms make some sort of sense in
relation to one another . . . . This broader sense of the systematicity of law
helps explain why we think of a body of law as consisting of not just legislation
and decisions in particular cases, but also principles whose content reflects
powerful themes that run implicitly through the whole body of law and that
are reflected in various ways in its explicit norms.
Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2008); see also
DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 165–66 (outlining the normative claim of “political integrity,”
which assumes that government functions in a morally principled and coherent manner);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 39–45 (1977) (explaining the importance of
recognizing the principles underlying legal rules and incorporating them into legal adjudication such that legal decisions comport with those principles).
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language and the elusive nature of the rights it protects forecloses
that possibility. A conceptual inquiry based on logical reasoning
will not always be an easy or infallible one, 305 but it does offer a
more accessible method that respects the straightforward linguistic meaning of the Constitution’s words, the type of government it
created, its moral authority, and the universality of human reasoning. This applicational methodology is far more accessible to the
governed than one premised on specialized historical research or
unbridled judicial policymaking.
To recapitulate, by tethering the Constitution’s legal content to
the commonsense meaning of its words, and then requiring the use
of logical reasoning based on readily available criteria, the conceptual approach offers a coherent applicational methodology that furthers the Rule of Law.
C. Escaping the Intentionality Trap
Finally, our subjects’ conceptual view of the Constitution offers
a way to avoid falling into what I term the “intentionality trap.”
This trap springs open when an interpreter who rejects as unworkable theories of interpretation that seek intent (legislative or public) in favor of seeking meaning overleverages his understanding of
a law’s “meaning” to the point that the interpretive inquiry slides
back into intentionalism. Doing so undermines his entire approach, because he ultimately ends up giving primacy to the subjective intent of someone, rather than the objective meaning of the
law that the text commands. A common understanding of the word
“meaning” is the existent or existents a given word signifies. This
is linguistic meaning. But in law, this linguistic meaning is oftentimes too imprecise to completely identify and distinguish its distinguishing characteristics, such that it cannot prescribe the applicational criteria for deciding particular cases. 306 At this point, the
interpreter has a critical choice to make: he must either conduct an

305. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 40–41 (“An assertion of a claim’s objectivity is not a
profession of infallibility about that claim. Remember that objectivity is context relative and
much of the relevant context is a person’s other knowledge at a given time.”).
306. See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
411, 419 (2013) (“With respect to vagueness, however, the original meaning of the text can
run out—by which I mean, the text simply does not specify whether a particular item is in
or out—for example, whether a particular search is ‘reasonable’ or a particular punishment
is ‘cruel.’”).
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objective inquiry into the nature of the referents identified by the
language or make a moral value choice to give primacy to the
speaker’s subjective opinions as to what those referents are. It is
clear at this juncture that the interpreter has pivoted from seeking
“meaning” to seeking applicational guidance. Moreover, if he
chooses the latter approach, he has entered the territory of intentionalism.
In legal discourse, however, we use the term “meaning” to describe both of these divergent exercises. 307 The conceptual approach treats “meaning” as the linguistic meaning of a word or
phrase at the time and in the context in which it is uttered. It then
acknowledges a moral value choice that must be made to actuate
that meaning in legal practice, but it defers to the value choice that
flows naturally from the Constitution—that which was ratified.
But others insist that “meaning” can do much more. Take for example a certain type of originalist who espouses a “thick” conception of “meaning.” In this originalist’s view, the “meaning” of a constitutional provision incorporates the contemporary linguistic
meaning of its words, its historical context, and rules of application
derived from political understandings of the time. 308
For example, suppose an interpreter of this school is tasked with
finding the original meaning of “due process of law” and applying
307. Richard Fallon has demonstrated this problem powerfully in a recent article. See
generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015). Fallon explains,
[I]n claiming what a statutory or constitutional provision means, judges, lawyers, and scholars often invoke or refer to what I characterize as its literal or
semantic meaning, its contextual meaning as framed by the shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, its real conceptual meaning, its intended
meaning, its reasonable meaning, or its previously interpreted meaning.
Among the foremost challenges for legal interpretation is to determine which
of these possible senses constitutes legal meaning, either categorically or in a
particular instance.
Id. at 1239.
308. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport espouse this thick view of “meaning.” They
contend:
Under an original public meaning analysis that focuses on how a reasonable,
well-informed reader would understand the language of a clause, language is
ordinarily, if not always, reasonably understood as having a single meaning.
In some cases, this language will have a clear meaning. In other cases, it may
be ambiguous or vague, but there are various tools in the interpretive rules,
such as history, structure, and purpose, that can be employed to resolve uncertainty as to the single meaning of a provision. Thus, there is little reason to
believe that there will be two meanings to a provision that cannot be resolved.
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 751–52 (footnotes omitted).
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it to a case. He will begin by examining the linguistic meaning of
the words. Indeed, this is how proponents of “original public meaning” originalism describe their approach. For example, Justice
Scalia, perhaps the most prominent proponent of original public
meaning, stated:
The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute, and gives
it the meaning that its words were understood to bear at the time they
were promulgated. You will sometimes hear it described as the theory
of original intent. You will never hear me refer to original intent, because as I say I am first of all a textualist, and secondly an originalist.
If you are a textualist, you don’t care about the intent, and I don’t care
if the framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning in mind
when they adopted its words. I take the words as they were promulgated to the people of the United States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words. 309

Fair enough, but a member of Scalia’s interpretive school would
not stop there. Assume at this stage he concludes that the phrase
“due process of law” linguistically meant the same thing it means
today: fair and appropriate adjudicatory procedures. Next, the interpreter will conduct a historical inquiry in search of applicational
criteria. Speaking on whether the death penalty could fall within
the Constitution’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,”
Judge Scalia stated:
The Americans of 1791 surely thought that what was cruel was cruel,
regardless of what a more brutal future generation might think about
it. They were embedding in the Bill of Rights their moral values, for
otherwise all its general and abstract guarantees could be brought to
nought. Thus, provision for the death penalty in a Constitution that
sets forth the moral principle of “no cruel punishments” is conclusive
evidence that the death penalty is not (in the moral view of the Constitution) cruel. 310

So in Scalia’s view, “meaning” embraces both linguistic comprehension and the founding-era public’s moral judgments. Thus, the
interpreter must examine past usage of the terms to learn about
what types of procedures the ratifying public would have understood to constitute fair and appropriate adjudicatory procedures,
or, as Justice Scalia would term it, what their “moral values” were

309. Justice Antonin Scalia, A Theory of Constitution Interpretation, Remarks at The
Catholic University of America (Oct. 18, 1996), http://web.archive.org/web/19980119172058
/www.courttv.com/library/rights/scalia.html [https://perma.cc/2EHS-Z5GP].
310. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 146 (emphasis added).
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concerning due process. Once he has done so, he has found his applicational criteria: the words “due process of law” really “mean”
something like “the adjudicatory procedures thought fair and appropriate in eighteenth-century society.”
The problem with this practice for our hypothetical “meaning”
seeker is that he has leaned too far into his conception of “original
meaning,” such that he has obscured to himself the interpretive
choice he has made. It is true that examining historical usage of a
term might well be needed to identify the linguistic meaning of a
word or phrase (indeed, an interpreter using the conceptual approach might need to examine historical usage as part of the first
step of his interpretive inquiry—for example, “domestic violence”
had a different linguistic meaning in 1789 than it does today, and
identifying the correct concept is the first step in objective interpretation). However, when the linguistic meaning of a word is reasonably clear, poring over usage and past legal understandings of
the statutory terminology or other historical evidence to understand which objects the original public would have associated with
the textual referents is simply shoehorning intentionalism into the
“meaning” inquiry. This is because the interpreter’s use of this evidence has opened the door to original conceptions—that is, what
the founding generation thought the concept behind the language
embraced. This is just picking up intent and dropping it into a different place. Thus, the “original meaning” method we have just described is just as much an intentionalist method as the other methods it decries. And it is not textualist, either, because the fair
import of the Constitution’s language does not govern. At the end
of the day, the interpretive perils that drove him to eschew intentionalism in favor of the “original meaning” approach have crept
back in as a result of his choice of original conceptions over original
concepts. This is the inescapable intentionality trap inherent in relying on overly thick conceptions of “meaning.”
By contrast, the conceptual approach relies on the constitutional
structure and the moral authority readily inferable from that
structure, the only objective criteria with which to construct the
Constitution’s provisions. These criteria do not represent moral
conceptions; rather, they are derived through reasoning from the
law itself, as ratified. Our conceptual interpreters treated the
value choices as having already been made by the People in their
choice of government and the limits they placed upon it. By doing
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so, they ensured that they remained objective throughout their interpretive endeavors, including both their initial inquiries into
“meaning” and their subsequent developments of constructions in
particular cases.
Justice Cushing’s construction of the “liberty of the press” clause
in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 demonstrates this. Employing his characteristic textualism, he observed that the words
“liberty of the press” were “very general and unlimited.” 311 In light
of that broad text, he asked his friend John Adams, “what guard or
limitation can be put upon it?” 312 Thus, Justice Cushing had little
trouble divining the clause’s linguistic meaning, but recognized the
difficulty in applying it. At this point, his inquiry shifted from the
empirical to the logical. He examined the government of Massachusetts and compared it to that of England, in which truth was
not a defense to a libel indictment (in other words, “liberty of the
press” in England only protected the media from prior restraint). 313
But given that the Constitution of 1780 derived its moral authority
from its protection of liberty and its structure was designed to protect that moral authority, he found the criminal libel law’s stated
purpose of protecting public order and preventing revolution repugnant to those criteria:
The propagating literature & knowledge by printing or otherwise,
tends to illuminate mens [sic] minds, & to establish them in principles
of liberty. But it cannot be denied also—that a Free scanning the conduct of administration, & shewing the tendency of it, & where truth
will warrant, making it manifest, that it is subversive of all law, liberty & the constitution; it cannot be denied, I think, that this liberty
tends “to the Security of Freedom in a State;” even more directly &
essentially, than the liberty of printing upon literary & speculative
subjects in general. Without this liberty of the press, could we have
supported our liberties against british administration? Or could our
revolution have taken place? Pretty certain, it could not at the time it
did. Under a sense & impression of this Sort I conceive this article,
was adopted. 314

Thus, notwithstanding the conception of press freedom that existed in England and the colonies at the time the Constitution of
1780 was enacted (and which used the same identical words to

311.
312.
313.
314.

Letter from William Cushing to John Adams, supra note 14.
Id.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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identify that conception at common law), the criminal libel law offended the concept of a free press, insofar as that concept operated
in the colonies. Cushing’s use of historical evidence here is much
different from those who read “meaning” to include original conceptions. He used examples from American history to support his
logic-driven conclusion that “liberty of the press” must be broader
under the Massachusetts Constitution than under the laws of Britain, not to support a history-driven conclusion that the Framers or
the ratifying public would have thought that it must be.
Thus, like Madison and the other conceptualists we have identified, Justice Cushing moved from interpretation to construction
without sliding into the intentionality trap. He certainly inquired
into the original linguistic meaning of the words, but quickly concluded that the meaning was “very general and unlimited” 315 and
thus turned to a more nuanced analysis of the concept behind the
language, using the readily available structure and moral authority inherent in the government the Massachusetts Constitution
created. He did not inject his own moral values into the question,
and he did not embark on a historical inquiry into subjective understandings or “moral values” of those who ratified the language.
The result was a construction that paid fidelity to both the original
meaning of the language and the underlying principles behind the
provision, not one that relied on the ratifying public’s anticipated
construction of the provision at issue, the inevitable result of which
would have been a forced, under fixed construction that failed to
accommodate the actual words used. 316
CONCLUSION
Suppose in 1780 a copy of Massachusetts’ newly minted constitution made its way onto the Jennison farm, and Quock Walker got
his hands on it. He flipped it open to give it a glance and happened
to notice Article I: “All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may
be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.” What would his reaction have been? Would this language
315. Id.
316. Sure, the strictest construction of “liberty of the press” could be read to prohibit the
publication of falsehoods, but this strict construction was, in Cushing’s view, not a reasonable one, any more than a strict reading of “keep and bear arms” could be reasonably read to
embrace carrying around a severed limb. See id.
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have triggered in his mind a historical question about freedom and
equality under English law? Or would those words have caused
him to reflect upon the moral values of those who put those words
into law? Most likely, he would have done neither. Instead, he
would have done what most of us do when reading abstract moral
language: he would have assigned the terms their natural linguistic meaning. This was the language of freedom, and it communicated the idea of freedom. Then, he naturally would have reflected
upon his own situation. His was not a “free and equal” existence,
but the law said otherwise. What’s more, further reading would
have shown that the document in his hands created a government
built upon, and deriving its moral authority from, individual liberty. 317 He thus could not have reasonably concluded that his situation was lawful. He didn’t, because he dared to bring his lawsuit.
He won his freedom because Justice Cushing’s instruction to the
jury accorded with both the Constitution’s words and, more importantly, the concept of freedom and equality that lay beneath
those words.
This assumed scenario is more than “armchair speculation;” 318
it is a reasonable conclusion from the historical record and from
common logic. So, too is the conclusion that our interpreters used
the conceptual approach. Though they might not have employed
modern scholarly terminology, they clearly saw the constitutional
language as giving force to more than just the framers’ or the ratifiers’ subjective expectations, or to technical legal doctrines. They
saw it as recognizing, and protecting, the idea of liberty. Perhaps
we can learn something from their approach.

317. Time and again, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 refers to its various protections as crucial to the protection of liberty. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XIII (“In
criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts in the vicinity where they happen, is one of
the greatest securities of the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.”); id. art. XVI (“The
liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore,
to be restrained in this commonwealth.”); id. art. XVIII (“A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution . . . [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government. The people ought, consequently, to
have a particular attention to all those principles, in the choice of their officers and representatives . . . .”).
318. See Solum, supra note 24, at 47–55.

